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THE GRAY MARKET AND THE CUSTOMS REGULATION-IS
THE CONTROVERSY REALLY OVER AFTER
K MART CORP. V CAR TIER, INC.?
DONNA M. LACH*
INTRODUCTION
The 1980s have seen an influx of gray market goods into the United
States. Gray market goods, while legitimately produced and sold in a
foreign country under the authorization of the U.S. trademark owner,
enter this country through channels that the U.S. trademark owner has
not expressly authorized.' These goods are referred to as parallel impor-
tations when the U.S. trademark owner is also the importer of the trade-
marked goods.2 Often third parties, who have no association with the
business agreement that arranged for the production and distribution of
these goods, buy the products abroad, bring them into the United States,
and then sell them in the U.S. market in competition with the goods of
the owner of the identical U.S. trademark rights.3 Although the goods
are genuine in that they bear an authentic, rather than a copied or simu-
lated mark,4 they may have been produced for foreign markets5 and con-
sequently may be of a quality inferior to that of the product in which the
trademark owner has developed a good-will and reputation in the U.S.
market. In addition, gray market goods may not carry the same manu-
facturer warranties. 6 The influx of gray market goods has generated con-
* The author wishes to express her gratitude to Professor David J. Gerber of IIT Chicago-
Kent College of Law for his thoughtful guidance throughout the various stages of this Note.
1. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1055 (1986). " 'Authorized' means that the manufacturer has established an exclusive territory or
conditions of resale through some contractual agreement or agreements, by which the manufacturer.
distributor or trademark registrant generally agrees to sell only to particular entities and not to other
entities that may compete with the authorized channel." Staaf, The Law and Economics of the
International Gray Market: Quality Assurance. Free-Riding and Passing Off, 4 INTEII.. PROP. J. 191.
192 (1988).
2. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1555. This Note will refer to the importation of gray market goods and
parallel importation interchangeably.
3. Note, K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.: A Black Decision for the Gray Market. 38 AM. U.L.
REV. 463, 465 (1989).
4. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1555. The importation of copied or simulated marks is forbidden by
§ 42 of the Lanham Act. See infra note 198. "
5. Note, Questioning the Validity of Custoins Regulation 133.21: Ali Analysis ofOlympus Corp.
v. United States and Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United States.
24 Hous. L. REV. 1039, 1041 (1987).
6. Goods bearing a genuine U.S. registered trademark manufactured abroad are sometimes
made with different specifications for foreign markets. As a result, the product may not be the same
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comitant litigation 7 that has seen trademark holders and their authorized
distributors pitted against retail dealers who have profited from their
sales of gray market products.8
Congress first addressed the issue of the importation of gray market
goods in 1922 when it hurriedly amended the Tariff Act in reaction to
the Second Circuit decision in A. Bourois & Co. v. Katzel.9 This statute
was reenacted later in identical form, becoming section 526 of the Tariff
Act of 1930.10 Section 526(a) prohibits the importation of goods manu-
factured abroad that bear a trademark owned by a U.S. registered trade-
mark owner without the U.S. trademark owner's consent."I Opponents
of the gray market, who are generally holders of U.S. registered trade-
marks whose financial interests are being harmed by gray market impor-
tations, believe that section 526(a) should be given a literal interpretation
and that all gray market goods should be banned. These trademark own-
as the product that is advertised and marketed in the United States. Nolan-Haley, The Competitive
Process and Gray Market Goods, 5 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 231, 234 (1984).
7. Hilliard, Grey Market Goods.- Three Eras of Law, 25 PAT. L. ANN. § 4.03, at 4-7 (1988).
While there were only five reported gray market cases from 1923 to 1982, more than twenty have
been reported since 1982. Id.
8. Hilke, Free Trading or Free-Riding: An Examination of the Theories and Available Empiri-
cal Evidence on Gray Market Imports, 32 WORLD COMPETITION 75, 75 (1988).
9. 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
10. Section 526 of the Tariff Act has been codified as 19 U.S.C. § 1526. Courts have referred
to this statute as either § 526 or as § 1526.
19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1975) reads in relevant part:
(a) Merchandise bearing American Trademark: Importation Prohibited
(a) Except as provided by subsection (d) of this section, it shall be unlawful to import
into the United States any merchandise of foreign manufacture if such merchandise, or the
label, sign, print, package, wrapper, or receptacle, bears a trademark owned by a citizen of.
or by a corporation or association created or organized within, the United States, and
registered in the Patent and Trademark Office by a person domiciled in the United States
• . . unless written consent of the owner of such trademark is produced at the time of
making entry.
(b) Seizure and forfeiture
(b) Any such merchandise imported into the United States in violation of the provi-
sions of this section shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture for violation of the customs
laws.
(c) Injunction and damages
(c) Any person dealing in any such merchandise may be enjoined from dealing therein
within the United States or may be required to export or destroy such merchandise or to
remove or obliterate such trademark and shall be liable for the same damages and profits.
(d) Exemptions
(d)(l) The trademark provisions of this section and section 1124 of Title 15, do not
apply to the importation of articles accompanying any person arriving in the United States
when such articles are for his personal use and not for sale.
(e) Merchandise bearing counterfeit mark; seizure and forfeiture; disposition of seized
goods
(e) Any such merchandise bearing a counterfeit mark . . . imported into the United
States in violation of the provisions of section 1124 of Title 15, shall be seized and, in the





ers, who have made considerable investments in advertising their prod-
ucts and providing warranties, service, and consumer education to the
American public, claim that their reputation and sales value are being
harmed by the sale of gray market goods. ' 2 This is because the importers
and retailers of gray market goods are able to take advantage of the price
differential between U.S. and foreign markets and sell the gray market
goods to consumers at considerably lower prices.' 3 Hence, proponents of
the gray market importation of goods into this country have favored the
interpretation that the Customs Service has given section 526.
The Customs Service, an agency of the Treasury Department, has
the responsibility of enforcing and interpreting the Tariff Act. 14 In the
Customs regulation, section 133.21(c), the Customs Service has inter-
preted section 526 to mean that certain imported goods may enter the
country even without the express consent of the U.S. trademark owner
when the owner of the domestic and foreign trademarks are the same,
when they have a parent/subsidiary relationship, or when the U.S. trade-
mark owner has licensed a foreign manufacturer to use the U.S. regis-
tered trademark. 15 The recent controversy in the courts regarding the
gray market issue has centered on the Customs Service's interpretation of
section 526. The circuits were split with two circuits upholding the va-
lidity of the Customs regulation and one circuit finding the entire regula-
tion invalid. 16
12. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
13. Bender & Gerber, In the Wake of High Court Decision, the Gray Market Gets Grayer, THE
NAT't1 L.J., Sept. 19, 1988, at 15, col. 1 (the price differential being the result of different prices being
asked for the same goods in different countries-a great disparity between the price charged in the
United States and the price charged in a foreign country creates the incentive to engage in the gray
market business).
14. 19 U.S.C. § 1624 (1982) reads in relevant part:
General Regulations:
In addition to the specific powers conferred by this chapter the Secretary of the Treasury is
authorized to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this
chapter.
15. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c) Restrictions not applicable, in relevant part:
The restrictions set forth in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section do not apply to
imported articles when:
(1) Both the foreign and the U.S. trademark or trade name are owned by the same
person or business entity;
(2) The foreign and domestic trademark or trade name owners are parent and subsidi-
ary companies or are otherwise subject to common ownership or control;
(3) The articles of foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark or trade name ap-
plied under authorization of the U.S. owner.
19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c) (1979).
This regulation also provides an exception to the protection provided to the trademark owner
under § 42 of the Lanham Act, which prohibits the importation of goods bearing a trademark that
copies or simulates a U.S. registered trademark. For the text of § 42 see infra note 198.
16. See Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied. 474 U.S.
1055 (1986) (finding the regulations consistent and reasonable and that Congress had implied its
1989]
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The Supreme Court recently addressed the validity of this contro-
versial Customs regulation vis-a-vis section 526 in K Mart Corp. v.
Cartier, Inc. 17 All parties with an interest in the fate of the gray market
had been waiting for a definitive answer to whether all gray market goods
would be banned from entry into the United States. The Supreme Court
represented a hope for both sides of the gray market issue. Both propo-
nents and opponents of the gray market were wishing that the Court
would espouse the policy that they were advancing. The Court unex-
pectedly severed a subsection of the regulation, thereby creating a situa-
tion in which some gray market goods would be barred entry into the
United States and others would continue to be allowed in. The circuit
courts as well as the legal scholars had viewed the regulations as a unit
and had expected the Court to decide whether gray market goods should
or should not be banned entirely.18 Instead, however, the Court focused
on the language of the statute and on whether Customs' interpretation
was a permissible construction of the statute.' 9 Five Justices upheld the
common control exceptions, 20 which refer to imported goods if the trade-
mark is owned by the same person or entity or if there is a parent/subsid-
iary relationship. A different combination of five Justices held invalid the
authorized use exception, 2' which refers to goods produced abroad that
bear a registered trademark under the authorization of the U.S. trade-
mark holder.
Policy decisions, however, are not the domain of the Supreme
Court. While the Court had the opportunity to decide on a U.S. gray
market policy, it based its decision on an analysis of the regulation vis-A-
vis the words of the statute written over sixty years ago. The result was
justifiable as a linguistic study but arbitrary as a gray market policy in
that Customs will now have to bar the entry of some but not all gray
market goods. An analysis of the K Mart decision and the procedural
consent to the regulation); Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 108 S. Ct. 20J3 (1988) (upholding the regulations on the grounds of congressional acquiescence
and a longstanding interpretation of § 526 by the Customs Service); Coalition to Preserve the Integ-
rity of American Trademarks v. United States, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986), rev'd il part and aff'd
in part sub nom., K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988) (finding the regulations
invalid because the language of § 526 is unambiguous and the legislative history of § 526 showed
that the interpretation of the statute by the Customs Service was not a reasonable one); United States
v. Eighty-Nine Bottles of Eau de Joy, 797 F.2d 767, 770 (9th Cir. 1986) (though not directly address-
ing the issue of the validity of the regulations, finding that the legislative intent in passing § 526 of
the Tariff Act was "to bar the importation of genuine goods unless authorized by the domestic
trademark holder"). See also infra notes 176-197 and accompanying discussion.
17. 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988).
18. Hilke, supra note 8, at 75.
19. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1817.
20. § 133.21(c)(1) & (2).
21. § 133.21(c)(3).
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history that led up to it demonstrates the shortcomings of the Supreme
Court in a policy-making capacity.
This Note will focus on the Supreme Court's decision in K Mart and
the Court's inability to resolve issues that are essentially policy questions.
Part I will discuss the pros and cons of the gray market in general, while
Part II will address the different interpretations of legislative history that
influenced the Justices and the courts to draw their divergent conclu-
sions. After an examination of the history of the K Mart case, Part III
will analyze the reasoning in the three opinions. Then, Part IV will con-
sider the impact of the decision on the gray market. This Note will dis-
cuss the policy considerations that can be resolved by only Congress,
concluding that Congress should decide on an overall gray market posi-
tion that would include a reassessment and clarification of the extent of
protection provided by section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930. Finally,
this Note will recommend a ban on all gray market importations.
I. THE GRAY MARKET CONTROVERSY
The business of parallel importation involves goods that are gener-
ally well-known brands of high quality22 and has an estimated value of
nearly $10 billion a year. 23 The gray market importation of goods flour-
ished in the early 1980s as a result of the U.S. dollar's dramatic apprecia-
tion on the international exchange. 24 The scenario in which the gray
market "problem" arises is an international business arrangement in
which a good bearing a registered U.S. trademark is produced abroad
under the authorization of the U.S. trademark holder. Typically this ar-
rangement can be either one in which the U.S. trademark owner is also
the owner of the foreign company or one in which the trademark owner
sets up a parent/subsidiary or a licensing relationship with a foreign
manufacturer to produce the goods. The business arrangement can also
be one in which a foreign business sets up a U.S. distributor or subsidiary
that registers the foreign trademark in the U.S. The arrangement inevita-
bly involves restrictions imposed by the business agreement for importa-
tion of the goods into the U.S. through certain designated distribution
22. Staaf, supra note 1, at 193-94. For example, the organization, COPIAT. has among its
members the holders of well-known, high quality trademarks, such as Cartier and Charles of the
Ritz. The goods come from approximately twenty different countries. Id. at 194.
23. Kersner & Stein, Judicial Construction of Section 526 and the Importation of Grey Market
Goods: From Total Exclusion to Unimpeded Entry, 11 N.C.J. INT'i. L. & COM. REG. 251. 251 (1986).
See also Note, Grey Market Imports: A Genuine Problem Jbr the United States Trademark Owner
Customs Service. and Courts, 7 Nw. J. INT't L. & Bus. 762, 762 n.1 (1986).
24. "A commercial fact of life is that the gray market is very much a creature of the fluctuating
dollar." Bender & Gerber. supra note 13, at 15. col. I.
1989]
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channels. The gray market "problem" then arises when the business ar-
rangements are frustrated, usually by third parties unrelated to the agree-
ment, who purchase the goods abroad and then import them for sale in
the United States.
The conflict exists between those importers and retailers who profit
from the sale of gray market goods in this country and the holders of
U.S. registered trademarks who contend that their legally protected
property rights have been violated. The legal question in the controversy
comes down to whether U.S. trademark protection requires Customs to
stop the entry of the gray market goods at the border. Customs regula-
tion section 133.21(c) has had the effect of letting third parties bring in
goods that bear a U.S. registered trademark without the permission of
the trademark holder.2 5 The broader policy question, however, concerns
a conflict of values between the importance of permitting free competi-
tion in the American market and the need for protecting the property
rights of the trademark holder.26
The competing arguments can be delineated as follows. Trademark
owners emphasize that a trademark protects their interests and that the
gray market importation of goods contravenes that protection. The
trademark, "a monopoly conferred by law, ' ' 27 protects its holder in sev-
eral ways. It symbolizes the goodwill and reputation that the trademark
owner has established in the product. It also distinguishes the trademark
owner's goods from other goods by signifying a single source of produc-
tion and level of quality. Finally, it represents the trademark holder's
investment in this quality and in advertising and customer service. 28
These opponents of the gray market note a number of reasons why gray
market sellers can sell goods at lower prices: the fluctuations in interna-
tional currency markets, lower labor and materials costs in different
countries, arbitrary price discrimination, 29 and also the fact that the gray
25. Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 317 (2d Cir. 1986). Customs maintains that
a trademark owner cannot infringe its own mark, which is why it treats the U.S. company and the
foreign company "as being constructively one for infringement purposes." Lever Bros. v. United
States, 877 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
26. Comment. Preventing the Importation and Sale of Genuine Goods Bearing American-Owned
Trademarks: Protecting an American Goodwill. 35 ME. L. REV. 314 338 (1983).
27. Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163. 1176 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). See also Mackin-
tosh. with editorial contributions by Graham. Grey Market Imports: Burgeoning Crisis or Emerging
Policy, II N.C.J. INT'l L. & Com. REG. 293, 296-97 (1986) (like patents and copyrights, trademarks
are limited monopolies, with the exception that patent and copyright rights are created by statute.
whereas trademark rights come fiom prior use in trade).
28. Note, Trademark Law. Economics and Grey-Market Policy. 62 IND. L.J. 753. 755 (1987).
The trademark helps consumers to identify products that they wish to purchase again, and the "ten-
dency to make repeal purchases ... is the basis of the producer's goodwill." Id.
29. Price discrimination is the result of firms charging different prices in different locations.
[Vol. 65:221
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market seller does not have the expenses involved with advertising, con-
sumer education, or warranty and service that the trademark holder
has. 30
Those opposed to the gray market importation of goods into the
United States contend that gray market goods mislead consumers and
that gray market importers get a free-ride on the promotional efforts of
the trademark owner. 31 First, since gray market goods are marketed
outside the trademark owner's authorized channels of distribution that
are responsible for the promotion, support, and service of the product in
the United States, 32 most gray market sellers rely on the reputation that
the trademark owner has established in order to create a demand for
their products. As a result, gray market sellers have no incentive to
maintain a product quality as high as that of the trademark owner.
33
Thus, gray market opponents claim that consumers are misled because
they expect the same warranty and products liability protection and war-
ranty service, as well as other protections such as quality and safety, of-
fered by the U.S. trademark holder. 34 The differences in such protections
offered by gray market goods lead to consumer confusion as to the source
and quality of goods. 35 Secondly, opponents argue a related point that
gray market importers free-ride on the goodwill and reputation that the
U.S. trademark holder has developed, resulting in a loss of time, energy
and money for the registered trademark holder. The gray market im-
porter takes advantage of the advertising of the trademark holder, while
the trademark holder's sales might actually decline because of the confu-
sion caused by the differing prices and quality. 36 Finally, opponents
point out that the continued influx of gray market goods may eventually
Gray marketers profit from price discrimination by buying goods in a market in which the goods are
sold at a lower price than they are sold in their U.S. market and then reselling them in the United
States. Hilke, supra note 8, at 78-79.
30. Osawa. 589 F. Supp. at 1176.
31. Fitzpatrick & Brunet, Barring Importation of Gray Goods Under Section 42 of The Lanlham
Act. and Seclion 526 of the Tariff Act, in GRAY MARKETS AND PARALI-El IMPORTATION 9, 12
(Practising Law Institute ed. 1986).
32. COPIAT v. United States. 598 F. Supp. 844, 850 (D.D.C. 1984).
33. Note, Vivitar Corp. v. United States: Protection Against Gray Market Goods Under 19
U.S.C. Section 1526, 60 S. CAI. L. Rt v. 179. 194 (1986) (the exception to this rule being some large
gray market sellers such as K-Mart. which offers its own service and warranties on gray market
goods).
34. Fitzpatrick & Brunet, supra note 31. at 1-12.
35. "Source- includes not only the geographic origin of the goods, but also the entire chain of
distribution upon which the consumer can rely. -Quality" includes the trademark owner's invest-
ment not only in the consistency in the product. but also in inventory and quality controls. shipping.
and storage. See generally. Note, The Gray Market Case: Trademark Rights v. Consumer Interests.
61 NOt Ri Dxsi" L. Riv. 838. 855-56 (1986).
36. Note. supra note 33. at 198-99. Free-riders benefit from the trademark holder's investments
iln advertising. warranties, dealer training, quality inspection and repair service. While C consLun1Crs
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lead to unemployment in the domestic industry, which will affect the
consumers' interests in the long run.
37
Proponents of the gray market, on the other hand, contend that the
gray market importation of goods protects consumer interests by pro-
moting competition and maintaining low prices. 38 In this vein, they ar-
gue that the trademark protection of section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930
encourages anti-competitive practices and violations of antitrust law and
policy.3 9 This is true, they argue, because foreign businesses set up sub-
sidiaries or licensees in the United States to register their trademarks and
then charge inflated prices for their trademarked goods in their Ameri-
can market. The result is that American consumers pay significantly
higher prices than their foreign counterparts for the same goods. 40 The
proponents also note that recently many of the larger retail dealers of
gray market goods have begun providing their own warranties and other
services that cover these goods, 4 1 thereby weakening the opponents' ar-
gument of consumer confusion.
The theory of trademark exhaustion is used to justify the importa-
tion of gray market goods. Under this theory, once the first sale of a
marked good takes place after the good has entered the stream of com-
merce in the trademark owner's territory, the trademark owner's rights
are "exhausted," that is to say, the trademark owner can no longer con-
trol sales of the trademarked goods.4 2 It has also been argued that the
trademark owner also loses rights to control subsequent sales of trade-
marked goods even once the goods have been sold abroad. 43 Courts that
have considered the exhaustion theory are split in applying it to situa-
tions in which the U.S. trademark holder had established a separate and
distinct goodwill in its product. One court conceded that an assignee of
the trademark in a second country can, in fact, develop a "separate, fac-
become confused when they buy products of a lesser quality than represented by advertising, which
results in an eventual decline in purchases of the trademark owner's product. Id.
37. Nolan-Haley, supra note 6, at 233.
38. Note, supra note 35, at 839.
39. Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1176 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (where defendants
argued that § 526 encourages discriminatory pricing by allowing higher prices to be charged to U.S.
distributors, which, in turn, means that the U.S. consumer pays the higher, discriminatory price).
The scope of this Note does not reach the antitrust issue.
40. Kelly, Ali Overview of the Influx of Grey Market Goods Into the United States, II N.C.J.
INT'l L. & COM. RFG. 231, 250 (1986).
41. Hilke, supra note 8, at 89 (for example, K-Mart and Wards).
42. Note, supra note 35, at 853. The exhaustion theory, however, does not make clear why
trademark rights should be exhausted after marketing the trademarked goods. Takematsa. Parallel
Iinportation of Trademarked Goods: A Comparative Analysis, 57 WASH. L.REv. 433, 456-57 (1982).
43. Note, The Greying of American Trademarks: The Genutine Goods Exclusion Act anid the
Incongruity of Customs Regulation 19 CER. ,§ 133.21, 54 FORDHAM L. Rhv. 83. 109 (1985).
[Vol. 65:221
GRAY MARKET CONTROVERSY
tually independent goodwill," '44 holding that the trademark holder was
entitled under both section 526 and trademark infringement to the in-
junctive relief sought. Similarly, where the plaintiff had provided a toll-
free number plus consumer education, the court found that even when an
assignment is revocable, it is possible to establish a separate, factually
distinct goodwill in the assigned trademark. 45 That court enjoined the
importation of the gray market products because it infringed on the
trademark holder's rights under both section 526 and the Lanham Act.46
Conversely, another court found no basis for protecting a trademark
holder's domestic goodwill where the U.S. trademark holder is "a cog or
entity" in a single international conglomerate. 47 The Ninth Circuit re-
fused to enjoin the importation of gray market computer chips where a
U.S. wholly-owned subsidiary had been assigned the trademark rights of
the Japanese parent.48 The court reasoned that the U.S. trademark laws
do not offer foreign companies "a vehicle for establishing a worldwide
discriminatory pricing scheme simply through the expedient of setting up
an American subsidiary with nominal title to its mark. '49
The parallel importation of trademarked goods is not unique to the
United States. Many of our trading partners have authorized the parallel
importation of goods in their courts or through treaties or legislation. 50
The courts of other nations have considered various theories in their
analyses of gray market importations. For example, one German court,
invoking the theory of exhaustion of trademark rights, held that a trade-
mark owner loses control of the trademarked goods once the goods are
put on the market in no matter which country. 51 Another German court
held that since the function of a trademark is to indicate the commercial
source of origin, even if the goods differed in quality, the parallel impor-
tation by third parties did not infringe the trademark rights.5 2 A Cana-
44. Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Moreover, the
court questioned the soundness of "these crude regulations," meaning § 133.21(c). Id. at 1178.
45. Premier Dental Prods. Co. v. Darby Dental Supply Co., No. 85-1780, slip op. (E.D. Pa.
July 16, 1985), aff'd, 794 F.2d 850 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986), rehg denied,
479 U.S. 1062 (1987).
46. Id.
47. Parfums Stern, Inc. v. United States Customs Ser., 575 F. Supp. 416, 418 (S.D.FI. 1983).
The court further noted that the defendants had relied on the plaintiff's acquiescence to their prac-
tice of importing gray market goods and that the public benefited from the lower prices. Id. at 420.
48. NEC Electronics v. Cal Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506 (9th Cir. 1987).
49. Id. at 1511. The court stated that the trademark law is designed to prevent consumer
confusion, which does not exist with a genuinely trademarked article. Id. at 1509.
50. Gorelick & Little, The Case for Parallel Importation, 11 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 205,
227 (1986). Parallel importation is permitted in most "economically significant" countries. Id.
51. Takamatsu, supra note 42, at 445, discussing Maja, Judgment of Jan. 22, 1964. Fed. Sup.
Ct. (W. Ger.).
52. Id., discussing Cinzano & Co. GmbH v. Java Kaffeegeschfte GmbH & Co.. Judgment of
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dian court refused to invoke either the doctrine of "passing off"'53 or a
claim of unfair competition to prevent parallel importation where there
was no evidence of deception or consumer confusion, 54 especially since
the court found that such a prohibition would result in a monopoly situa-
tion in which only an authorized dealer could sell a "complete pack-
age."' 55 The factors that one Japanese court considered in facing the
question of parallel importation were whether: 1) the trademark indi-
cated the manufacturer or the local distributor as the source of the
goods; 2) the goods were of equal quality; 3) the exclusive distributor's
goodwill was based on the brand name's reputation in the world market;
4) the parallel importation would promote free and fair competition in
both price and service; and 5) the importer of gray market goods was
taking advantage of the distributor's advertising.
56
In addition, some nations have entered into treaties or passed legis-
lation that make provisions for parallel importations. For example, in
the European Economic Community, the Treaty of Rome, which views
any export restriction as inherently anti-competitive and thus a per se
violation of the Treaty, takes precedence over the domestic law of the
member nations. 57 As a result, in a country like France, an authorized
seller can sue a parallel seller for unfair competition, but the trademark
holder cannot prevent the importation of such goods. 58 Japan has passed
legislation that provides that gray market goods will not be excluded
from the country where 1) the domestic trademark holder also holds the
foreign trademark and is supplying the goods to the third party; and 2)
the domestic and foreign trademark holders are part of the same business
entity. 59 Finally, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
Feb. 2, 1973, Fed. Sup. Ct. (W. Ger.). Similarly, an Austrian court relied on the exhaustion theory
and the functions of the trademark to deny injunctive relief against parallel importation. Id.. at 446.
discussing Agfa-Gevaert GmbH v. Schark, Judgment of Nov. 30. 1970, Sup. Ct. (Aus.).
53. Staaf, supra note 1, at 206. "Passing off" emphasizes consumer deception or confusion. Id.
54. Id. at 197.
55. Kelly, supra note 40, at 238, discussing Consumers Distributing Co. Ltd. v. Seiko Time
Canada Ltd., [1984] 1 S.C.R. 583.
56. Takamatsu, supra note 42, at 442, discussing Nestle Nihon K.K. v. Sankai Shoten (unre-
ported case, Tokyo Dist. Ct., May 29, 1965). In Japan. where there was a substantial difference in
taste between the domestic distributed coffee and the gray market coffee, the court found that con-
sumers may be deceived by the difference in quality and enjoined the parallel importation. Id. at
440. But where there was no difference in quality, the Japanese court rejected the principle of terri-
toriality (see infra notes 105-106 and accompanying discussion.) and instead focused on the function
of the trademark, applying the criminal law theory of "illegal in substance." Since there was nothing
"illegal in substance" in the lawsuit, the court permitted the parallel importation. Id. at 442.
57. Staaf, supra note 1, at 198 (the European Court of Justice views all vertical restraints within
the EEC per se illegal).
58. Id. at 199.
59. Takamatsu, supra note 42. at 443. Japan amended its Customs Duties Act in 1972 to allow
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ment has stated that enterprises should refrain from restricting the paral-
lel importation of goods where the only purpose of such a restriction
would be to maintain artificially high prices.
60
There have been several attempts to confront the gray market issue
in this country by various levels of government. In an effort to formulate
a comprehensive U.S. policy regarding the gray market, the Reagan Ad-
ministration appointed a committee composed of representatives from
various agencies. 6' The committee only was able to present to the Cabi-
net Council on Commerce and Trade a list of policy options rather than
a definitive solution. Its options were: 1) maintain the status quo where
foreign and U.S. trademark owners are related; 2) impose a mandatory
labeling system to inform consumers that the goods are not subject to the
same warranty and service benefits as U.S. goods; 3) amend section 337
of the Tariff Act of 1930 to facilitate gray market challenges in court; 4)
maintain the status quo where gray market goods are identical to the
U.S. trademark counterparts; 5) require the removal or obliteration of
the infringing trademark on the gray market goods; and 6) prohibit the
importation of all gray market goods that do not have the U.S. trade-
mark owner's written consent.
62
The Customs Service also attempted to resolve the gray market
problem when it solicited public comment on the issue of parallel impor-
tation. Specifically, the solicitations concerned two alternative ap-
proaches to the gray market problem: mandatory labeling and
mandatory removal of the trademark.6 3 In the meanwhile, however, the
Supreme Court agreed to hear K Mart, and the Customs Service did not
move forward on either of these approaches.
64
States have addressed the gray market problem, especially in the
area of consumer protection. For example, to cope with the consumer
confusion created by gray market goods, a few states have enacted stat-
utes requiring retailers to post notices indicating that certain gray market
goods may not carry the same warranties as other goods with the same
brand name and also that the goods might not have instructions in the
parallel importation under certain circumstances. The amendment represented a significant change
from its previous position. Id.
60. Gorelick & Little, supra note 50, at 228, citing Principle D4 of The Set of Multilaterally
Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practice'. U.N. Confer-
ence on Trade and Development at 10-1I, U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/CONF/10/Rev. 1 (1980).
61. Mackintosh, supra note 27, at 293 n.3. The agencies involved were the Departments of
State, Commerce and Treasury, the Office of Management and Budget. the Council of Economic
Advisors, the U.S. Trade Representatives Office, and the Justice Department. Id.
62. Id. at 293 n.4.
63. 51 Fed. Reg. 22005 (1986).
64. Hilke, supra note 8, at 75-76 n.4.
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English language.65
At the congressional level, Senator Chafee unsuccessfully intro-
duced a bill to the Senate Committee on Finance in 1986 that would have
amended both section 526 of the Tariff Act and section 42 of the Lanham
Act to allow the importation of gray market goods.66 Since the K Mart
decision, two bills have been introduced that would have an impact on
65. California, New York, and Connecticut have passed such statutes. The California statute
reaches all retailers who sell gray market goods, whereas the New York and Connecticut statutes
only reach retailers who "knowingly" sell such goods.
The California law provides in relevant part:
(a) Every retail seller who offers grey market goods for sale shall post a conspicuous
sign at the product's point of display and affix to the product or its package a conspicuous
ticket, label, or tag disclosing any or all of the following, whichever is applicable:
(1) The item is not covered by a manufacturer's express written warranty valid in
the United States (however, any implied warranty provided by law still exists).
(2) The item is not compatible with United States electrical currents.
(3) The item is not compatible with United States broadcast frequencies.
(4) Replacement parts are not available through the manufacturer's United
States distributors.
(5) Compatible accessories are not available through the manufacturer's United
States distributors.
(6) The item is not accompanied by instructions in English.
(7) The item is not eligible for a manufacturer's rebate.
(8) Any other incompatibility or nonconformity with relevant domestic stan-
dards known to the seller.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1797.81 (West 1988).
The New York statute provides in relevant part:
2. Every retail dealer who knowingly offers for sale grey market merchandise shall
conspicuously post, in the following manner, the information required by subdivision three
of this section:
a. On a sign attached to the item itself; or
b. On a sign affixed to each cash register or point of sale at which such goods are
offered for sale; or
c. On a sign so situated as to be clearly visible to the buyer from the register.
3. Every retail dealer who offers for sale grey market merchandise shall disclose, as
applicable, that either some of the products or a specific product are not:
a. accompanied by the manufacturer's warranty valid in the United States or
b. accompanied by instructions in English; or
c. eligible for a rebate offered by the manufacturer.
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 218-aa (McKinney 1988).
The Connecticut statute provides in relevant part:
(b) Every retail dealer who knowingly sells or offers for sale any gray markets mer-
chandise shall post conspicuously, on a sign attached to the item itself, on a sign affixed to
each cash register or point of sale at which such goods are offered for sale, or on a sign so
situated as to be clearly visible to the buyer from the register, that either some of the
products or a specific product are not: (1) Accompanied by the manufacturer's warranty
valid in the United States; (2) accompanied by instructions in English; or (3) eligible for a
rebate offered by the manufacturer.
(c) Every retail dealer or dealer engaged in a mail-order business who offers for sale
gray markets merchandise shall include the disclosure required by subsection (b) of this
section in any written advertisement relating to such product. Such disclosure shall be
made in type of a conspicuous size.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-210 (West 1986).
66. Senator Chafee's bill reads:
To provide for parallel imports in order to continue to provide savings for United
States consumers.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
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the protection offered by section 526 and on the gray market in general. 6
Representative Chandler has introduced a bill to amend the Tariff Act to
permit parallel importation and codify the Customs regulation, section
133.21 (c), thereby overturning K Mart's invalidation of Customs' author-
ized use exception. 68  Senator Hatch has introduced a bill to amend the
America in Congress assembled. That this Act may be cited as the "Price Competitive
Products Act of 1986."
SEC. 2. Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930 is amended by adding at the end thereof
the following:
"*(f)(1) Nothing in this section shall restrict the importation or sale of foreign-made
articles bearing a trademark or trade name identical with one owned and registered by a
citizen of the United States or a corporation or association created or organized within the
United States when--
"(A) both the foreign and the United States trademark or trade name are owned
by the same person or business entity;
"(B) the foreign and domestic trademark or trade name owners are parent and
subsidiary companies or are otherwise subject to common ownership and control; or
"(C) the articles of foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark or trade name
applied under authorization of the United States owner.
"(2) As used in paragraph (1), the term-
"(A) 'common ownership means individual or aggregate ownership of more than
50 percent of the business entity; and
"(B) 'common control' means effective control in policy and operations and is not
necessarily synonymous with common ownership."
SEC. 3. Section 42 of the Act of July 5, 1949 (15 U.S.C. 1124), known as the Lanham
Trademark Act, is amended by-
(1) inserting "(a)" before "Except"; and
(2) adding at the end thereof the following:
"(b)(l) Nothing in this section shall restrict the importation or sale of foreign-made
articles bearing a trademark or trade name identical with one owned and registered by a
citizen of the United States or a corporation or association created or organized within the
United States when-
"(A) both the foreign and the United States trademark or trade name are owned
by the same person or business entity;
"(B) the foreign and domestic trademark or trade name owners are parent and
subsidiary companies or are otherwise subject to common ownership or control or
"(C) the articles of foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark or trade name
applied under authorization of the United States owner.
"(2) As used in paragraph (1), the term-
"(A) 'common ownership' means individual or aggregate ownership of more than
50 percent of the business entity; and
"(B) 'common control* means effective control in policy and operations and is not
necessarily synonymous with common ownership."
S. 2614, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
67. At the time of publication of this Note, both bills are pending in Congress.
68. H.R. 771, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). The House bill, introduced by Representative
Chandler on February 2, 1989. would validate the entry of gray market goods by amending the
TariffAct. This bill would codify the Customs regulation, including the "authorized use" exception
invalidated by K Mart. Bill is Introduced in House to Codij Customs Position on Gray Market
Inports, 6 INT'i. TRADE REP. (BNA) 7. at 200 (Feb. 15. 1989).
The bill reads:
To provide for the continuation of parallel imports under section 526 of the Tariff Act
of 1930.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Price Competitive
Products Act of 1989."
Sec. 2. Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1526) is amended by adding at
the end thereof the following:
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Lanham Act that would prohibit all gray market importations, which
includes the scope of section 526 and invalidates the exclusionary Cus-
toms regulation. 69  Thus, both new bills aim to overturn the K Mart
"(f)(1) Nothing in this Act or the Act of July 5, 1946 (60 Stat. 427; chapter 540)
shall restrict the importation or sale of foreign-made articles bearing a trademark or
trade name identical with one owned and registered by a citizen of the United States
or a corporation or association created or organized within the United States if-
"(A) both the foreign and the United States trademark or trade name are
owned by the same person or business entity;
"(B) the foreign and domestic trademark or trade name owners are parent
and subsidiary companies or are otherwise subject to common ownership or con-
trol; or
"(C) the articles of foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark or trade
name applied under authority of the United States owner.
"(2) For purposes of this subsection-
"(A) The term 'common ownership' means individual or aggregate
ownership of more than 50 percent of the business entity.
"(B) The term 'common control' means effective control in policy and
operations and is not necessarily synonymous with common ownership.
"(3) Notwithstanding any provision of title 17, United States Code, the importa-
tion or sale of any article that could otherwise be legally imported shall not be re-
stricted by reason of a copyright in its trademark or in the label, package, design,
instructions for use, or other material accompanying the article."
69. S. 626, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). The Senate bill, introduced by Senator Hatch on
March 16, 1989, would ban all gray market goods, whether or not they copy or simulate a U.S.
registered trademark, by amending the Lanham Act. This bill would invalidate all of the exceptions
to trademark protection under both the Lanham Act and the Tariff Act that Customs has created in
§ 133.21(c).
The bill reads:
To amend the Lanham Trademark Act regarding gray market goods.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Trademakk Protection
Act of 1989."
(b) The Congress finds that -
(1) the importation and/or sale of gray market goods (which are, for pur-
poses of this Act, goods manufactured abroad to which a foreign trademark is lawfully
applied but which are imported into the United States without the authorization of the
United States owner of the identical or similar trademark), fundamentally violate
United States trademark law;
(2) gray market goods cause confusion to consumers that trademark laws
are designed to avoid because such goods, intended for sale abroad, frequently differ in
their physical characteristics from goods intended for sale in the United States, such
as-
(A) gray market cosmetics may contain ingredients that are
either banned in the United States or are otherwise considered less desirable from
the perspective of a United States consumer;
(B) gray market vehicles may not include safety devices com-
mon in vehicles manufactured for sale in the United States market;
(C) gray market batteries may have shorter lives when sold to a
United States consumer simply because of delays and lack of care in trans-ship-
ment; and
(D) gray market goods are frequently not subject to the same
quality control, warranties provided in the United States and other features that
consumers may expect from a-particular trademarked good;
(3) whether or not consumers are confused by gray market goods, the im-
portation or sale of such goods deprives United States trademark owners of their in-
vestment in their trademark;




Former President Reagan had an opportunity to voice his opinion
on policy regarding the gray market issue when, pursuant to his power
under section 3 37(g)(2) 70 of the Tariff Act of 1930, he disapproved of the
velopment and such interbrand competition ultimately benefits consumers with lower
prices and increased quality and selection;
(5) the loss of goodwill occasioned by gray market goods is in violation of
fundamental tenets of our trademark laws; and
(6) the importation and sale of gray market goods in the United States
must be prevented to preserve the integrity of our trademark system.
(c) The Act of July 5, 1946, the Lanham Trademark Act (15 U.S.C. 1051 et
seq.), is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:
"Sec. 52.(a) No person may import into or sell within the United States any
good that is manufactured outside the United States if such good, or the label,
sign, print, package, wrapper, or receptacle, bears a trademark that is identical to
a trademark-
"(1) owned by a person that is a citizen of the United States or by a corpo-
ration or other entity created within the United States under the laws thereof or the
laws of one of the States, the District of Columbia, one of the territories, or the Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico, without regard to the citizenship of its incorporators,
shareholders, officers, or directors, and
"(2) registered by such person with the Patent and Trademark Office
under the provisions of this Act, unless such person consents to such importation or
sale.
"(b) The prohibitions of subsection (a) apply regardless-
"(1) of whether the foreign manufacturer of the goods or foreign trade-
mark owner whose trademark appears on the goods is related in any way, by corpo-
rate affiliation or otherwise, to the owner of the United States trademark;
"(2) of whether the owner of the United States trademark owns or has
registered the trademark abroad; or
"(3) of whether the owner of the United States trademark has authorized
the use of the trademark abroad.
"(c) The Secretary of the Treasury shall exclude from entry into the United
States any good the importation of which is in violation of subsection (a), provided
that the person who owns the trademark in question in the United States and who has
registered that trademark with the Patent and Trademark Office files a copy of the
certificate of registration for such trademark with the Secretary of the Treasury.
"(d) Any owner of a United States trademark may bring an action against the
importer or seller of goods that bear identical trademarks in violation of section (a) in
any Federal district court to enjoin such importation or sale and to obtain money
damages and lost profits for the wrongful use of a trademark by reason of such impor-
tation or sale, under the provisions of this Act.
"(e) For purposes of this section, the term-
"(1) 'person' means any individual or entity including but not limited to
any corporation or partnership; and
"(2) 'United States' means the territory comprising the 50 States, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.
"(f) The exceptions to the prohibitions of section 526(a) of the Tariff Act of
1930, set forth in section 526(d) of that Act, apply to the prohibitions set forth herein.
"(g) The Secretary may promulgate regulations to implement subsection (b) but
such regulations must enforce subsection (b) fully for any owner of a trademark in the
United States regardless of whether-
"(1) such trademark owner or its subsidiary or other affiliate manufactures
or sells goods bearing an identical or similar trademark abroad;
"(2) such trademark owner owns and/or has registered such trademark
abroad; or
"(3) such trademark owner has authorized the use of such trademark
abroad."
70. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(2) (1982):
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determination of the International Trade Commission in In re Certain
Alkaline Batteries.7t Alkaline Batteries, more commonly referred to as
the Duracell Case, was brought as a violation of section 33772 of the
Tariff Act of 1930, alleging that plaintiff's sale of batteries was being
undercut by the unauthorized importation of genuine Duracell batteries
from Belgium that were manufactured there for European consump-
tion.7 3 The United States International Trade Commission held that the
importation of the gray market batteries constituted a trademark in-
fringement. 74 The Commission added that the "origin" of a product is
not just the "manufacturer but also the distribution chain. '7 5 While sec-
tion 526 was not challenged in this case, Vice Chairman Liebler added an
opinion in which he disagreed that section 526 was intended to only
cover a situation in which a U.S. company buys the trademark rights of a
foreign company.76 President Reagan stated that the International Trade
Commission's interpretation of section 42 of the Lanham Act was "at
odds with the longstanding regulatory interpretation by the Department
of the Treasury . . . [and with] [r]ecent decisions that explicitly uphold
the Treasury Department's interpretation. '77 In effect, the President was
(2) If, before the close of the 60-day period beginning on the day after the day on
which he receives a copy of such determination, the President, for policy reasons, disap-
proves such determination and notifies the Commission of his disapproval, then, effective
on the date of such notice, such determination and the action taken under subsection (d),
(e), or (f) of this section with respect thereto shall have no force or effect.
71. 6 I.T.R.D. 1864 (1984).
72. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1975). Unfair practices in import trade. § 337(a) reads:
(a) Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles into
the United States, or in their sale by the owner, importer, consignee, or agent of either, the
effect or tendency of which is to destroy or substantially injure an industry, efficiently and
economically operated, in the United States, or to prevent the establishment of such an
industry, or to restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States, are de-
clared unlawful, and when found by the Commission to exist shall be dealt with, in addi-
tion to any other provisions of law, as provided in this section.
73. Alkaline Batteries, 6 I.T.R.D. at 1851.
74. Id. at 1852. Violations of § 337 were found on six grounds:
1) infringement of a registered trademark under the common law of trademarks; 2) violation of
§ 42 of the Lanham Act; 3) violation of § 32(l) of the Lanham Act; 4) misappropriation of trade
dress; 5) false designation of origin; and 6) violations of the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act.
75. Id. at 1864 (holding that defendants violated § 337 because they had violated § 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, which controls the false designation of origin).
76. "Just because section 526 was enacted in response to the decision of the Court of Appeals in
Bourjois does not imply that the statute should only control the narrowest version of the facts
presented in Bourjois.'" Id. at 1869.
77. Note, Parallel Importation-Legitimate Goods or Trademark Infringement? 18 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'i L. 543, 571(1985), citing Letter from President Ronald Reagan to Paula Stern. Chair-
man, United States International Trade Commission (Jan. 4, 1985):
The Commission's interpretation of section 42 of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. 1124).
one of several grounds for the Commission's determination, is at odds with the longstand-
ing regulatory interpretation by the Department of the Treasury.... The Administration
has advanced the Treasury Department's interpretation in a number of pending court
cases. Recent decisions explicitly uphold the Treasury Department's interpretation. Al-
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referring to Vivitar 7 8 and the District Court decision in COPIA T,79
which upheld the validity of the Customs regulation. Since the time the
President wrote this letter, COPIAT was reversed by the Circuit Court
of the District of Columbia, which, in turn, was affirmed in part and
reversed in part in K Mart.
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930
The legal issue in the gray market controversy has centered on the
interpretation of the extent to which section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930
protects trademark holders. A discussion of the legislative history of sec-
tion 526 necessarily begins with the Second Circuit decision in A. Bour-
jois & Co. v. Katzel,80 to which Congress reacted, at least in part, with the
enactment of section 526 while the case was still pending in the Supreme
Court. In Katzel, A. Bourjois & Co., an American firm, purchased all of
the U.S. business and goodwill of a French producer's business in "Java"
face powder. 8 ' A. Bourjois & Co., having paid a considerable sum for
the rights, registered the trademark and continued importing the product
while developing a business identity separate from that of the French
manufacturer. When a competitor, Katzel, then began purchasing the
product in France and selling it in the United States under the French
trademark, Bourjois brought suit to enjoin Katzel from infringing on
Bourjois' registered trademarks. 82 The Second Circuit found no infringe-
ment under section 27 of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905,83 since Katzel's
goods were genuine in that they bore a genuine trademark. 84 Congress
reacted to the perceived unfairness of the result in Katzel, not by amend-
ing the existing trademark laws, but rather by amending the Tariff Act.85
lowing the Commission's determination in this case to stand could be viewed as an altera-
tion of that interpretation. I, therefore, have decided to disapprove the Commission's
determination.
78. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), aff'g 593 F. Supp. 420 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986).
79. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United States, 790 F.2d 903
(D.C. Cir. 1986), rev'd 598 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1984), affd in part and rev'd in part sub non. K
Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988).
80. 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd., 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
81. Bourjois called the product "Poudre Java," whereas the product was called "Poudre de Riz
de Java" before Bourjois purchased the rights. Id. at 540.
82. Id. at 540.
83. Section 27 of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905 was later reenacted as § 42 of the Lanham Act of
1946. See infra note 198.
84. Katzel, 275 F. at 543.
85. Note, supra note 43, at 91. The Tariff Act coincidentally happened to be before Congress at




That amendment, section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1922, made the impor-
tation of goods bearing the same trademark as a genuine U.S. trademark
unlawful without the consent of the U.S. trademark owner.86
There is very little legislative history to shed light on the congres-
sional intent of section 526. The provision was introduced as a floor
amendment to the Tariff Act of 1922, and the debate on the proposed
amendment, which was limited to only ten minutes, was "hasty, con-
fused, and ill-informed. ' 87 The records from the debates indicated that
the Senators were confused both about the nature of the proposed legisla-
tion8 8 and the details in Katzel.89 The language originally set out did not
specify goods "of foreign manufacture" or "owned by a citizen of, or by a
corporation or association created or organized within, the United
States." 90 These changes were added as a result of Senate floor discus-
sions.91 The final exchange of the debate has proven to be an important
source for the interpretation of the congressional intent behind section
526 and has since been viewed in several ways by the courts.92 In the
final minutes, Senator Lenroot asked whether section 526 would protect
a foreign manufacturer whose American agent registered the trademark
in the United States from parallel importation.93 Senator McCumber's
response was that only registered trademarks owned by American domi-
ciliaries would be protected.94 Dissatisfied with the response, Senator
Lenroot rephrased his question to ask if an international trademark regis-
tered in the United States by an American domiciled in the United States
could be brought in without the written consent of the American agent. 95
86. See supra note 10.
87. Kersner & Stein, supra note 23, at 258.
88. 62 CONG. REC. 11,602 at 11,605 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1922). Senator McCumber mistakenly
thought that the original version of § 526 protected only registered trademarks that were owned by
American domiciliaries.
89. Id. at 1 1,603. Senator Moses stated that "the whole subject matter involved in this amend-
ment is now before the courts of the United States for determination."
90. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.. 108 S. Ct. 1811, 1823 (1988).
91. 62 CONG. REC. at 11,604.
92. See Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1055 (1988). "Our review of the comments in the floor debate leads us to the conclusion that the
debate is too unfocused and misinformed to serve as a definitive basis for interpretation of § 1526."
Id. at 1563; Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 319 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 2033 (1988) (not discussing the legislative history at length, because it agreed with the Vivitar
court that § 1526 was adopted primarily to overturn the Second Circuit decision in Katzel);
COPIAT v. United States, 790 F.2d 903, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1986), rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 108 S.
Ct. 1811 (1988) (inferring from the legislative history that "the lawmakers consciously drew the line
at American companies and did not adopt distinctions among different categories of American
companies").





Time ran out, and Senator Lenroot's question was never answered. 96
The sparse legislative history does not directly answer whether Congress
really meant what it said in the statute about barring the importation of
goods with the same trademark as a genuine U.S. trademark or whether
it enacted section 526 merely to overrule the Second Circuit's decision in
Katzel.
97
The Supreme Court heard Katzel several months after the enact-
ment of section 526. In reversing the Second Circuit decision, the Court
focused on two factors: Bourjois' purchase of the trademark rights from
the foreign manufacturer and the goodwill value of the trademark.9 8 The
Court thereby rejected the prevailing legal theory of universality, which
controlled the Second Circuit's decision in Katze199 as well as previous
infringement cases.'00 The theory of universality states that trademarks
do not confer property interests or monopoly power over intrabrand
competition; instead, they protect the public from being deceived by indi-
cating the origin of the trademarked goods.' 0 ' Under this theory, since
trademarks are universal and not territorial, there could be no infringe-
ment when goods enter another country where the trademark has been
registered.10 2 Consequently, the only remedy that an American assignee
of a trademark right could have against the foreign assignor was in
breach of contract or unfair competition.' 0 3 In Katzel the Supreme
Court instead adopted the doctrine of territoriality. 0 4 Whereas the focus
of protection under the universality theory was the consumer and the
origin of the product, the focus of protection under the territoriality the-
96. Id.
97. Note, supra note 35, at 846.
98. A. Bourjois & Co., Inc. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689, 692 (1923).
99. A. Bourjois & Co., Inc. v. Katzel, 275 F. at 543 (2d Cir. 1921). The court stated: "Trade-
marks ... are intended to show without any time limit the origin of the goods they mark, so that the
owner and the public may be protected against the sale of one man's goods as the goods of another
man. If the goods sold are the genuine goods covered by the trade-mark, the rights of the owner of
the trade-mark are not infringed." Id.
100. E.g., Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 F. 18 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886) (where an American had
purchased the exclusive right to import certain bottled water into the United States and the right to
use the trademark, and a third party began importing the water, the court found that since the water
was genuine and the public was not deceived, there was no infringement); Fred Gretsch Mfg. v.
Schoening, 238 F. 780 (2d Cir. 1916) (where the court found no infringement of a U.S. trademark on
violin strings that were registered by the exclusive agency for sale in the U.S. when a competitor
brought the violin strings from Germany. noting that § 27 of the Trademark Act of 1905 was
designed to protect the public from goods that were not genuine).
101. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier. Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811, 1822 (1988).
102. Note. supra note 43. at 107.
103. Atwood, Import Restrictions oo Trademarked Merchandise-The Role of the United States
Bureau of Customs, 59 TRADIEMARK Ri',. 301, 303 (1969). Thus, it was not considered unlawful for
third parties who sold lawfully marked goods to compete with the U.S. trademark holder. Id.
104. Kaizel, 260 U.S. at 692 (stating that the monopoly of a trademark is no less complete than
the monopoly of a patent).
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ory is the trademark holder and the separate legal existence of the trade-
mark as the source of origin of the goods in each country in which it is
registered. 0 5 The theory of territoriality recognizes that the function of
the trademark is to symbolize the domestic goodwill in the mark. 106
The cases that were heard shortly after the passage of section 526 of
the Tariff Act of 1922 suggest that the application of section 526 was not
limited to the Katzel fact pattern. When the question of whether Cus-
toms should exclude genuine goods bearing a U.S. registered trademark
arose in A. Bourjois & Co. v. Aldridge,10 7 the Court determined that un-
authorized genuine goods did "copy or simulate" the U.S. registered
trademark and could be excluded under section 27 of the Trade-Mark
Act of 1905.108 The Court's determination that unauthorized genuine
goods can be excluded under the Trademark Act implies that section 526
also encompasses more than the situation in which a U.S. company
purchases the trademark rights of a foreign company in the U.S.10 9 In
Coty, Inc. v. Le Blume Import Co. 1"0 the Second Circuit looked at the
plain language of section 526 and allowed Customs to withhold the entry
of the gray market perfume.II Judge Learned Hand stated that had the
Supreme Court reversed Katzel earlier, Congress would not have enacted
section 526, adding that section 526(a) was only meant to supply the
105. Note, supra note 43, at 107-108.
106. Note, supra note 35, at 841. "[Dlomestic trademarks are distinct from identical foreign
trademarks if the product has become associated in the public's mind with the American assignee
and not with the foreign manufacturer." Note, Should "Greymnarket" Trade be Illegal? "COPIAT"
Fuels the Controversy, 7 J.L. & CoM. 163, 168 (1987).
107. 263 U.S. 675 (1923) (per curiam).
108. Id. at 676. In 1913, the plaintiff, A. Bourjois & Co., Inc. purchased from Wertheimer &
Cie., a French company, its entire U.S. business in certain toilet powders and face tints, including the
"sole and exclusive right to manufacture and sell" them in the U.S. A. Bourjois & Co.. Inc. v.
Aldridge, 292 F. 1013, 1013-14 (1922). In 1915, the plaintiff registered the two trademarks, POU-
DRE MANON LESCAUT and BOUQUET MANON LESCAUT, while Wertheimer & Cie. con-
tinued to produce and sell a product that was identical to the U.S. product in France. A third party,
Benhart Co., bought some of the powder in France with the intention of importing it into the United
States. Bourjois brought this suit against Aldridge, the collector of Customs at the port of New
York, for declining to exclude the French product. Id. at 1014. The two questions certified by the
Second Circuit were:
(1) Is the sale in the United States of Wertheimer's Manon Lescaut powder an in-
fringement of plaintiff's registered trade-marks?
(2) Is the collector, by section 27 of the Trade-Mark Law, required to exclude from
entry genuine Manon Lescaut powder so as aforesaid made in France?
Id.
The Supreme Court answered both in the affirmative. 263 U.S. at 676.
109. Note, supra note 43, at 96-97. "AIdridge recognizes that exclusion of genuine goods should
not be limited to technical and individual infringement determination made by some courts today.-
Id. at 97.
110. 292 F. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1923), aff'd. 293 F. 344 (2d Cir. 1923).
Ill. Coty had moved to dismiss LeBlume's motion to compel Coty to withdraw its notice to
Customs to keep the gray market perfume from entering the country. Id. at 265.
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casus omissus that existed in section 27 of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905,
and thus the business relationship between the foreign and domestic
markholders was irrelevant under section 526.112 In a third case, the
Second Circuit did not permit an American tourist to import a car bear-
ing the same trademark as that held by a U.S. registered trademark for
her personal use. In Sturges v. Clark D. Pease, Inc.,' 13 the court stated
that "[b]y the Tariff Act Congress adopted the policy of protecting the
American owners of foreign trademarks by the most drastic means.""t 1 4
Thus, early case interpretations of section 526 indicate that the courts
viewed the statute without the restrictions later imposed by Customs.
The Tariff Act of 1922 was repealed and reenacted as the Tariff Act
of 1930 without any changes.' '5 Later, while Congress was in the pro-
cess of holding hearings on the then proposed Lanham Trade-Mark Act
of 1946, the United States Tariff Commission" 16 submitted to Congress a
memorandum, which pointed out the current administrative practices as
well as the relationship between section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and
section 27 of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905."17 Though Congress consid-
ered taking the provisions of section 526 out of the Tariff Act and putting
them instead into the Trade-Mark Act, in the end, section 42 of the Lan-
ham Act was simply a reenactment of section 27 of the Trade-Mark Act
of 1905, and section 526 of the Tariff Act was left intact."" Thus, Con-
gress, aware of the existing conflict regarding the coverage of section 526,
chose not to change section 526.'t9 Congress later considered amending
section 526 when it was discussing the Customs Simplification Act of
1954. The proposed amendment 120 would have excluded from the pro-
112. Id. at 269. The Osawa court gave the following explanation of what Judge Learned Hand
meant by casus omissus: "What Hand's observation meant was only that the passage of § 526 would
have been unnecessary and would not have occurred if the Bourjois Supreme Court decision had
been rendered earlier, bringing such "genuine" goods within the coverage of § 27." Osawa & Co. v.
B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1175 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
113. 48 F.2d 1035 (2d Cir. 1931). The decision in this case was overturned in 1978 by the
passage of § 526(d).
114. Id. at 1038. The court added, "However much we may differ with its policy, the wisdom of
the legislation is for the lawmaking body, and we cannot say that the means adopted were unadapted
to the end sought to be attained." Id.
115. The Senate unsuccessfully attempted to amend § 526 by banning all imports of goods bear-
ing a U.S. registered trademark by deleting the provision that requires the trademark owner's con-
sent to allow such imports. See generally, Kersner & Stein, supra note 23, at 259-60.
116. The United States Tariff Commission is now called the International Trade Commission.
COPIAT v. United States, 790 F.2d 903, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
117. Id.
118. Atwood, supra note 103, at 306. "From 1938 until 1946, all the reports accompanying the
trademark bills which culminated in the Lanham Act stated that their purpose was to clarify the law
and to remove laws relating to trademarks from such unlikely places as tariff acts." Id.
119. COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 914.
120. H.R. 9476, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1954). The proposed amendment stated, in relevant part:
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tection of section 526 American trademark owners affiliated with owners
of identical trademarks. 1
2 '
Antitrust considerations regarding the anticompetitive effects of
manufacturer-imposed intrabrand restrictions 22 came into play in the
1950s. The Justice Department filed suit in 1957 against three perfume
importers, charging them with unlawful monopolization under section 2
of the Sherman Act in United States v. Guerlain, Inc. 123 The importers
had been assigned the perfume trademarks by the manufacturer, who
continued to supply them the perfume. The U.S. licensees tried to bar
the entry of the gray market perfume under section 526 of the Tariff
Act. 124 The district court ruled in favor of the government, holding that
the Tariff Act must be viewed in light of the antitrust laws' 25 and that
section 526 does not extend its protection to a registered U.S. trademark
holder who is part of a single international business enterprise. 26 The
court agreed with the Justice Department that there is a "related party"
exception to section 526 and that a per se violation of the Sherman Act
occurred whenever the U.S. trademark holder imposed restrictions on
product distribution once the product had already been released into
commerce. 127 The court found that the trademark was an important ele-
ment in selling the perfumes and rejected the defendants' arguments
about the free-ride the gray-market importers had on their advertising
efforts, since the profitability of the gray market imports in itself was
SEC. 526. Merchandise Bearing American Trade-Mark.
(a) Unless written consent of the owner of a mark or name entitled to the protection of
this section is produced at the time of making entry, it shall be unlawful to import into the
United States any merchandise of foreign manufacture if such merchandise, or the label,
sign, print, package, wrapper, or receptacle bears a name or mark which copies or simu-
lates a mark registered in the Patent Office on the principal register.., or under the name
of any domestic manufacturer, or trader, or of any manufacturer or trader located in any
foreign country which, by treaty, convention, or law affords similar provileges [sic] to citi-
zens of the United States, provided that a copy of the certificate of registration of such
mark or the name entitled to the above protection is filed with the Secretary of the Treas-
ury, in accordance with regulations which the Secretary shall prescribe.
121. COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 915. The bill closely paralleled the provisions of the Customs regula-
tion § 133.21(c). Id.
122. Intrabrand competition is among distributors of the product of a particular manufacturer,
whereas interbrand competition is among the manufacturers of the same "generic" product. Conti-
nental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977).
123. 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), vacated and remanded, 358 U.S. 915 (1958), action dis-
missed, 172 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). The defendants were Guerlain, Inc., Parfums Corday,
Inc., and Lanvin Parfums, Inc.
124. Id. at 79.
125. Id. at 83.
126. Id. at 91.
127. Hilliard, supra note 7, at 4-5. This was consistent with the view that prevailed in the 1960s
and 1970s that manufacturer-imposed restrictions on distribution of products after their release into
commerce was a per se Sherman Act violation. Id.
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evidence of the anti-competitive impact. 28 The appeal went directly to
the Supreme Court. However, at the request of the Solicitor General,
who promised to encourage Congress to clarify the Tariff Act, the Court
vacated the decision in Guerlain with prejudice to the government with-
out hearing the case.
129
In the aftermath of Guerlain, in 1959 Congress considered the Celler
Bill 130 that would have repealed section 526 altogether. After a debate
over trademark property rights and the conflicting antitrust concerns,
that proposal was also defeated in committee before hearings were even
held. 13' In 1969, an attempt to repeal section 526 while Congress was
considering an amendment to the Lanham Trade-Mark Act of 1946
failed.132 Congress did, however, amend section 526 in 1978 when it cre-
ated an exception in section 526(d) 133 for goods brought into this country
by individuals for their personal use. 134 Senator Chafee's attempt in 1986
to amend section 526 of the Tariff Act to provide for the parallel impor-
tation of goods also failed.1 35 The most recent effort to amend section
526 was proposed on February 2, 1989 and would provide for parallel
importation under section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930.136 This pro-
posed amendment, however, is countered by a Senate bill that would ban
128. Guerlain, 155 F. Supp. at 87, 89.
129. The Supreme Court vacated the decision with prejudice to the government, even though the
district court had ruled in favor of the government. Atwood, supra note 103, at 306-307.
130. The Celler Bill, H.R. 7234, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959), in relevant part:
SEC. 2. Section 45 of this Act (15 U.S.C. 1127) is amended by changing the period at
the end of the sentence defining "counterfeit" to a comma and adding, "but it does not
include a mark used by a foreign manufacturer or merchant to identify and distinguish his
goods and registered to a person who is an agent, authorized distributor, or subsidiary of,
or who is affiliated with or is controlled by, such foreign manufacturer or merchant. The
term 'affiliated,' as employed herein and in section 42(b)(1), shall include, but not be lim-
ited to, an exclusive or a nonexclusive distribution contract and any arrangement whereby
the person has a continuing contractual relationship or understanding, express or implied,
with the foreign manufacturer or merchant with regard to the mark."
Sec. 3. Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (June 17, 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 741; 19
U.S.C. 1526) is repealed.
131. COPIAT v. United States, 790 F.2d 903, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1986). For discussions that present
contrasting views of the Celler Bill, see generally, Derenberg. Current Trademark Problems in For-
eign Travel and the Import Trade, 49 TRADEMARK REP. 674 (1959) and Vandenburgh, The Problem
of Importation of Genuinely Marked Goods is not a Trademark Problem, 49 TRADEMARK REP. 707
(1959).
132. S. 3713, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
133. 19 U.S.C. § 1526(d)(1) (1978). See supra note 10 for text of the statute.
134. One court found that this exemption further suggests that Congress' intent in passing § 526
was to exclude all genuine goods bearing the U.S. registered trademark without the domestic owner's
authorization. United States v. Eighty-Nine Bottles of Eau de Joy, 797 F.2d 767, 771 (9th Cir.
1986).
135. S. 2614, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). For the text of the bill, see supra note 66.
136. H.R. 771, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). See also supra note 68.
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parallel importations by amending the Lanham Act. 37
B. Customs Regulation 133.21
After the enactment of section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1922, the
U.S. Customs Service, a part of the United States Treasury Department,
was assigned the task of promulgating regulations for the administration
and enforcement of the statute. 1 38 An examination of the Customs regu-
lations regarding trademarks reveals that the Customs Service's policy
has not been consistent over the years.' 39 The Customs Regulations of
1923 did not specify what constituted a violation of section 526.140 Thus,
Customs was not carving out any exceptions to section 526's protection
at that time. After the enactment of the Tariff Act of 1930, the Customs
Regulation of 1931 likewise provided total protection against the impor-
tation of genuine goods bearing a U.S. trademark without the consent of
the trademark owner. 141
In 1936 the Customs Regulation began to change. The Customs
Regulation of 1936, article 518, no longer referred to section 526 of the
Tariff Act. Because the Customs Service attempted to respond to the
language of section 27 of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905,142 article 518 re-
fers to goods bearing trademarks that copy or simulate U.S. trade-
marks. 143 Moreover, article 518 exempted articles that bear foreign
trademarks owned "by the same person, partnership, association, or cor-
poration" as the registered U.S. trademark from the protection offered by
section 27 of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905. 144 Congress considered arti-
cle 518 in 1944 when it held hearings on legislation that would become
137. S. 626, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). At the time of the publication of this Note, this bill
was still in committee. See also supra note 69.
138. See 19 U.S.C. § 1624 (1982) supra note 14.
139. Atwood, supra note 103, at 301.
140. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 420, 428 (Ct. Intl. Trade 1984) (discussing
Articles 475-480 of the Customs Regulations of 1923).
141. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding that the bar
against genuinely trademarked goods in Article 518(a) of the Customs Regulation of 1931 appeared
to be absolute).
142. COPIAT v. United States, 790 F.2d 903, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
143. Customs Regulations of 1936, Art. 518 in relevant part: Prohibition of importation -
(a) Merchandise of foreign or domestic manufacture is prohibited importation when
it bears a name or mark which copies or simulates a trade-mark or trade name entitled to
the protection of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905 or the Trade Mark Act of 1920, unless such
merchandise is imported by or for the account of, or with the written consent of, the owner
of the protected trade-mark or trade name.
T.D. 48,537, 70 Treas. Dec. 336, 337 (1936).
144. COPIAT, 790 F.2d 903, 914 (stating that "it is doubtful that amended Article 518 even
purported to interpret Section 526 as well as Section 27," but Customs did refer to § 526 in 1943
when it recodified its regulations).
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the Lanham Trade-Mark Act of 1946.145 In a memorandum it submitted
to Congress, the United States Tariff Commission referred to article 518
as promulgating section 27 of the Trademark Act of 1905 rather than
section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930, even though "[s]ection 526 of the
tariff act does apply to the merchandise of the trade-mark owner which
bears his trade-mark if the merchandise was produced abroad and if the
trade-mark owner is a citizen of the United States."'' 46 Thus, it was an
informed Congress that passed section 42 of the Lanham Act of 1946,
leaving section 526 of the Tariff Act as it was.
147
In 1951, Frank Dow, then Commissioner of Customs, sent a letter
to Senator Paul H. Douglas in which he stated that the Customs Service
did not view section 526 as barring the importation of trademarked
goods of the foreign subsidiary of an American trademark owner., 48 In
1953, the Customs Service promulgated new regulations under 19 C.F.R.
§ 11.14.149 The amended regulation made no reference to section 526 as
a statutory authority. 50 In addition, it no longer barred goods without
the U.S. trademark owner's consent if the foreign trademark was owned
by a "related company" as defined by section 45 of the Lanham Act of
1946,'1' which covers both licensees and commonly-owned compa-
nies. t52 However, as it became known during the Guerlain litigation, 53
in practice, some U.S. trademark owners enjoyed more protection than
others, depending on whether their trademarks were recorded before or
after disclosure of affiliates became obligatory under the 1953 amended
regulation.' 5 4 The Customs Service responded to Guerlain in 1959 by
withdrawing all reference to "related companies" from 19 C.F.R.
§ 11.14.155 The new regulation removed the protection of section 526
145. Id.
146. Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Patents on H.R. 82, United States Senate,
78th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1944).
147. COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 914.
148. Id. at 914-15.
149. The 1953 amended version of 19 C.F.R. § 11.14(b) denied the protection of§ 526 when the
foreign and U.S. trademarks were owned by "a related company as defined in Section 45 of the
Trade-Mark Act of 1946." T.D. 53,399, 88 Treas. Dec. 376, 384 (1953).
150. Id. at 385; COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 915 (the D.C. Circuit stating that evidence suggested that
Customs nevertheless continued to consider related companies as outside the protection of § 526).
151. Note, supra note 43, at 99 n.91. "The term 'related company' means any person who legiti-
mately controls or is controlled by the registrant or applicant for registration in respect to the nature
and quality of the goods or services in connection with which the mark is used." 15 U.S.C. § 1127
(1982).
152. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
153. United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). For discussion, see supra
notes 123-129 and accompanying text.
154. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1566.
155. Atwood, supra note 103, at 310 (notwithstanding, Customs continued to exclude goods
from the protection of § 526).
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only from U.S. trademark owners who owned rights abroad and thus
were considered the "same entity," thereby reverting to its 1936 excep-
tion.' 56 There could be no uniform enforcement of this new regulation,
however, since disclosure was only required for principal/agent relation-
ships.' 5 7 Thus, under the 1959 regulation, Customs denied the protec-
tion of section 526 when the domestic and foreign trademark were owned
by the same person, partnership, association, or corporation, 58 even
though it had deleted the "related company" exception.
Customs again promulgated new regulations in 1972. It is the 1972
regulation, section 133.2 1(c)' 59 that has been challenged in the courts
and that was at issue in the K Mart case. Section 133.21(c) has been
viewed as implementing the Customs Service's perception of antitrust
law' 60 as a reaction to Guerlain.'6 1 It contains the "same entity" limita-
tions of the 1953 and 1959 regulations; in addition, it excludes from the
protection of section 526 all owners of a U.S. trademark with common
ownership or parent/subsidiary relationships with foreign companies, as
well as licensed foreign manufacturers. 62 Customs has been criticized
for its reasoning in this regulation for several reasons: first of all, the
rationale of the district court opinion in Guerlain was repudiated by the
Supreme Court, 63 secondly, Customs lacks the expertise and authority
to interpret antitrust law,164 and finally, antitrust theory has changed a
great deal since the late 1950s when Guerlain was heard. 65 For exam-
ple, while the Supreme Court supported the Customs regulation when it
found per se violations of the Sherman Act arising from manufacturer-
imposed intrabrand restrictions on the distribution of products after the
products had been released into commerce, 66 that opinion was later
156. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1567 (the "same entity" requirement was satisfied by parent/subsidiary
relationships).
157. Id.
158. Note, supra note 43, at 100 n.97.
159. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
160. COPIAT v. United States, 790 F.2d 903, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (noting that the notice in the
Federal Register that accompanied the 1972 regulation, 37 Fed. Reg. 20,677 (1972), did not explain
the Customs Service's reasoning behind this regulation).
161. Id. at 916.
162. Customs requires disclosure of all names of those affected by section 133.21(c). 19 C.F.R.
§ 133.2 (1972).
163. United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 358 U.S. 915 (1958).
164. Note, supra note 35, at 848. Only the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion have been given antitrust enforcement powers. Id. at 848 n.67. The Osawa court called
§ 133.21(c) "unsound both as antitrust policy and as trademark law." Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo.
589 F. Supp. 1163, 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
165. COPIAT v. United States, 790 F.2d 903, 916 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
166. Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315. 319-20 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing United States
v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.. 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967)).
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overruled. t6 7 The Court instead found that restrictions on intrabrand
distribution may in fact promote interbrand competition. 168  Thus, the
Supreme Court had cast doubt on the appropriateness of regulations that
rest on antitrust considerations.'
69
Even Customs has sought a clarification of the protection provided
to trademark holders under section 526. In 1983 Customs along with the
Department of Justice filed an amicus brief in Bell & Howell: Mamiya
Co. v. Masel Supply Co.,t70 which dealt with the question of the importa-
tion of gray market cameras brought as a violation of section 42 of the
Lanham Act. Curiously, the brief urged the court to give section 526
"the normal meaning of the statutory language," 17' which suggests full
protection to the trademark owner, without any exceptions.
The history of the Customs regulations enforcing section 526 indi-
cates that Congress has known that Customs has made exceptions to the
protection of section 526 by refusing to bar the entry of certain gray mar-
ket goods. When Congress, aware of administrative policy, acts on cer-
tain legislation in certain ways without upsetting the administrative
policy, it is said that Congress has acquiesced to that policy. 172 The pol-
icy of the Supreme Court in reviewing an agency's interpretation of a
statute is to examine the statutory language along with the design and
purpose of the statute.' 73 With an agency regulation the first question to
be decided is whether the agency's interpretation is a permissible con-
struction of the statute, 74 and, if there is no conflict with the purpose of
the statute, the Court will defer to that agency's interpretation.1
7 5
167. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977).
168. Id. at 54. The Court noted that interbrand competition "provides a significant check on the
exploitation of intrabrand market power because of the ability of consumers to substitute a different
brand of the same product." Id. at 52 n.19.
169. Olympus, 792 F.2d at 320.
170. 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983).
171. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1568. See also, COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 916.
172. "When an agency's interpretation and application of a particular statute are known to Con-
gress, and Congress either amends the statute without affecting the administrative practice or refuses
to act at all, the administrative interpretation of a law is presumed to be correct and consistent with
Congressional intent." COPIAT v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 844, 852 (D.D.C. 1984) (citing Haig
v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 297-98 (1981)).
173. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811, 1817 (1988) (citing Bethesda Hosp. Assn. v.
Bowen, 485 U.S. 399 (1988)).
174. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
When deciding whether an interpretation is a permissible construction of a statute, the Court is faced
with the question of whether Congress has directly spoken to that issue. If the answer is yes, then
the agency must give effect to that expressed intent. If Congress has not directly addressed a particu-
lar question in issue, the Court must decide if the agency's interpretation is a reasonable construction
of the statute. Id. at 842-43.
175. Id. at 844 (legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless arbitrary. capricious.
or manifestly contrary to the statute).
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The scant legislative history of section 526 has led to conflicting in-
terpretations of the legislative intent in enacting section 526 of the Tariff
Act of 1930. Courts have been faced with deciding on the validity of the
interpretation that the Customs Service's regulation section 133.21(c)
gives to section 526(a). In 1984 the owner of the VIVITAR trademark
brought suit in the Court of International Trade t7 6 challenging section
133.2 1(c) per se. In Vivitar Corp. v. United States,177 the Vivitar Corpo-
ration sought a declaratory judgment that would have the Customs Ser-
vice exclude imports bearing the VIVITAR mark. The trademark owner
was a California corporation that had granted a license to a foreign man-
ufacturer. The goods manufactured in foreign countries were marketed
abroad by wholly owned subsidiaries of the California corporation, but
the subsidiaries had no authority to import the products into the United
States.' 78 The Vivitar Corporation argued that the independent dealers
who were importing Vivitar products and selling them at lower prices
were getting a free-ride on its legitimate business expenses. This free-ride
would, in time, ruin the reputation and sales value of the VIVITAR
trademark. 179 The Court of International Trade found that the Customs
regulation was both consistent over time and a reasonable interpretation
of section 526. The court concluded that section 526 was only passed to
overturn the Second Circuit decision in Katzel, and that, therefore, the
court did not believe that section 526 was meant to deal with the problem
of free-riding on a trademark holder's goodwill, reputation and advertis-
ing. Moreover, the court added that international commerce had been
176. The Court of International Trade held that it had exclusive jurisdiction over the Vivitar
claim. The court based its holding alternatively on 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(3) and/or (4). Vivitar, 760
F.2d at 1560.
28 U.S.C. § 1581 (i) (1986) states:
(i) In addition to the jurisdiction conferred upon the Court of International Trade by
subsections (a)-(h) of this section and subject to the exception set forth in subsection (j) of
this section, the Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil
action commenced against the United States, its agencies, or its officers, that arises out of
any law of the United States providing for-
(1) revenue from imports or tonnage;
(2) tariffs, duties, fees or other taxes on the importation of merchandise for rea-
sons other than the raising of revenue;
(3) embargoes or other quantitative restrictions on the importation of merchan-
dise for reasons other than the protection of the public health or safety; or
(4) administration and enforcement with respect to the matters referred to in
paragraphs (1)-(3) of this subsection and subsections (a)-(h) of this section.
The question of jurisdiction was raised in K Mart. The Supreme Court rejected the reasoning of
the Vivitar court. See infra note 223.
177. 593 F. Supp. 420 (Ct. Intl. Trade 1984), aff'd, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied.
474 U.S. 1055 (1986).
178. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1556.
179. Id. Vivitar justified its higher prices because it has legitimate business expenses that the
discount houses that sell gray market goods do not have, e.g., advertising and warranty costs. Id.
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substantially relying on the Customs regulation.1 80
The Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of International Trade's
holding that the Customs regulation was "a reasonable exercise of ad-
ministratively initiated enforcement"' 8' and that "Customs is not re-
quired to exclude all grey market goods sua sponte."' 82 The Federal
Circuit rejected, however, the Court of International Trade's views that
section 526 was passed merely to overturn Katzel,183 that the regulation
had been consistent over the years, and that Congress had implied its
consent of the regulation. 18 4 Instead, the court concluded that a trade-
mark owner's recourse against parallel importation could be found in the
courts, and the courts, in their discretion, could impose an injunction
against the entry of particular gray market goods.
18 5
A similar suit, Olympus Corp. v. United States,186 began in New
York. The American Association of Exporters and Importers undertook
to eliminate the exemption under section 133.21(c)(2) regarding parent/
subsidiary relationships. Before turning to the courts for relief, the
Olympus Corporation unsuccessfully lobbied to get Customs to abolish
the related companies exception to section 526.187 Customs and the
Treasury Department "declined to change this practice by a mere regula-
tory change."' 18 8 Consequently, the Olympus Corporation, which owns
its U.S. trademark rights and an exclusive distributorship and is the
wholly owned subsidiary of a Japanese corporation that manufactures
cameras, lenses, flash units and filters, sought to enjoin the importation
into the United States of Olympus products manufactured abroad with-
out the written consent of the New York corporation. The K-Mart Cor-
poration and 47th Street Photo, Inc. intervened as defendants because of
their interest in gray market Olympus products. The district court found
that section 133.21 was not contrary to section 526. Though the Second
180. Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 436.
181. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1571.
182. Id. at 1569.
183. Id. at 1565.
184. Id. at 1568.
185. Id. at 1569. The Federal Circuit remarked that the Customs regulation does not control on
the question of whether gray market goods should be excluded. A trademark owner is free to pursue
private remedies under § 526(c). Id. The remedies provided by § 526 are seizure and forfeiture of
the merchandise (§ 526(b)) or an injunction and damages (§ 526(c)).
186. 627 F. Supp. 911 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
187. Comment, Customs-The Gray Market-The Latest Word: Olympus Corporation v.
United States, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986), 11 SuFFOLK TRANSNAT't L.J. 209, 210 n.9 (1987). The
vice president in charge of product importation of Olympus was also the chairman of the American
Association of Exporters and Importers, which lobbied to have § 133.2 1(c)(2) eliminated. Olympus
Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 317 (2d Cir. 1986).
188. Olympus, 792 F.2d at 317 (quoting the letter from John M. Walker, Jr.. Assistant Secretary
of the Treasury, to Senator Paul S. Sarbanes).
249
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Circuit found the regulation of "questionable wisdom,"' 189 it upheld the
district court's decision on the grounds that congressional acquiescence
to the regulation made the Customs Service's longstanding interpretation
of section 526 legitimate. 90 The court in Olympus agreed with the Viv-
itar court that section 526 was passed to overturn Katzel,'9' but it dis-
agreed with the latter in that it found that the regulations have been
sufficiently consistent. The Olympus court noted that there would be ad-
ministrative difficulties in excluding gray market goods at the borders
and suggested that it would be a good policy for Congress to change the
regulations. 92 The court pointed out that, despite the validity of the
Customs regulations, trademark owners could pursue a private right of
action under section 526(c). 193 Judge Winter dissented, stating that sec-
tion 526 was not only easy enough to enforce, but that it was not clear
what relevant policy the Customs regulation was meant to implement.
He denounced the theory that Congress' longstanding acquiescence car-
ries with it little weight where the Customs Service itself has been con-
fused about the regulation's purpose and validity. 194 Finally, a third suit
was brought by an association of owners of registered U.S. trademarks,
the Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks
("COPIAT"). In Coalition To Preserve the Integrity of American Trade-
marks v. United States ("COPIAT"),195 the organization, COPIAT, chal-
lenged the validity of Customs regulation section 133.21(c) as had been
done in Vivitar and Olympus. The district court in COPIA T found the
regulation valid as a sufficiently reasonable interpretation of the statute,
basing its view on the legislative history and on congressional acquies-
cence of Customs' longstanding interpretation of the statute. 196 The Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
judgment, finding Customs regulation section 133.21(c) invalid, 97
189. Id. at 320.
190. Id. at 321.
191. Id. at 319.
192. Id. at 320-21.
193. Id. at 320. For the text of § 526(c), see supra note 10. In a recent private action under
§ 526(c) in which the plaintiff was a U.S. wholly owned subsidiary of a Japanese firm the court
refused to grant an exclusion order. The court, while agreeing that the Customs regulations do not
define the full scope of protection provided by § 526(a), gave § 526(a) the same interpretation as was
given by the Customs Service. Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. ABC Int'l Traders Corp., 703 F. Supp.
1398, 1403 (C.D. Ca. 1988).
194. Olympus, 792 F.2d at 322 (Judge Winter agreeing with the D.C. Circuit's opinion in
COPIAT regarding the congressional intent behind the enactment of § 526). See generally infra
notes 196-197 and accompanying text.
195. 598 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1984). The K-Mart Corporation and 47th Street Photo. Inc.
intervened as defendants, as they had done in Olympus.
196. Note, supra note 5, at 1046.
197. COPIAT v. United States, 790 F.2d 903, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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thereby creating a split in the circuits in disagreement with the Vivitar
and Olympus decisions. It was COPIA T that reached the Supreme Court
as K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.
Recently, the D.C. Circuit heard a case in which Customs regula-
tion 133.21(c)(2) was again challenged, but this time as an interpretation
of section 42 of the Lanham Act, which prohibits the importation of
goods that copy or simulate goods that bear a U.S. registered trade-
mark.' 98 The plaintiff in Lever Bros. v. United States,199 a U.S. corpora-
tion that manufactures Shield soap and Sunlight dishwasher detergent,
has an affiliated corporation in the United Kingdom. 20 ° While the wrap-
ping used on the products is similar, the ingredients differ for the British
and U.S. markets.20' Third parties have been importing the U.K. prod-
ucts into the United States without the authorization of Lever Broth-
ers. 20 2 Customs has been allowing the gray market goods into the United
States under the section 133.21(c) exception to section 42 of the Lanham
Act, regarding as irrelevant the differences in the U.K. and the U.S.
products. 20 3 Lever Brothers contended, however, that though the goods
bear the same genuine trademark, the differences in physical content re-
sult in the foreign products copying or simulating the domestic trade-
198. Section 42 of the Lanham Act of 1946 has been codified as 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1978). It
reads:
Importation of goods bearing infringing marks or names forbidden
Except as provided in subsection (d) of section 1526 of Title 19, no article of
imported merchandise which shall copy or simulate the name of the [sic] any domestic
manufacture, or manufacturer, or trader, or of any manufacturer or trader located in
any foreign country which, by treaty, convention, or law affords similar privileges to
citizens of the United States, or which shall copy or simulate a trademark registered in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter or shall bear a name or mark calculated
to induce the public to believe that the article is manufactured in the United States, or
that it is manufactured in any foreign country or locality other than the country or
locality in which it is in fact manufactured, shall be admitted to entry at any custom-
house of the United States; and, in order to aid the officers of the customs in enforcing
this prohibition, any domestic manufacturer or trader, and any foreign manufacturer
or trader, who is entitled under the provisions of a treaty, convention, declaration, or
agreement between the United States and any foreign country to the advantages af-
forded by law to citizens of the United States in respect to trade-marks and commer-
cial names, may require his name and residence, and the name of the locality in which
his goods are manufactured, and a copy of the certificate of registration of his trade-
mark, issued in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, to be recorded in books
which shall be kept for this purpose in the Department of the Treasury, under such
regulations as the Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe, and may furnish to the
Department facsimiles of his name, the name of the locality in which his goods are
manufactured, or of his registered trademark, and thereupon the Secretary of the
Treasury shall cause one or more copies of the same to be transmitted to each collec-
tor or other proper officer of customs.
199. 877 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
200. Id. at 102.
201. Id. at 103.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 104.
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mark. 20 4 Though the D.C. Circuit remanded the case so that the district
court could do a detailed examination of the legislative history and ad-
ministrative practice, the court clearly indicated that, in its opinion, the
district court would hold section 133.21(c)(2) invalid in regard to section
42 of the Lanham Act.20 5 The significance of Lever Brothers in light of
the K Mart decision is that it indicates that K Mart neither resolved the
controversy regarding the Customs regulation nor presented any kind of
definitive statement regarding the gray market.
III. K MART CORP. V. CARTIER, INC.
A. Procedural History
The suit that eventually made its way to the Supreme Court as
K Mart v. Cartier was brought by American manufacturers and distribu-
tors of registered trademarked products who were suing either individu-
ally or by representation by the organization to which they belonged, the
Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT).
The trademarked goods included such items as perfumes, cosmetics,
watches, tires, crystal, cameras and other photographic equipment, bin-
oculars and electronic goods. The plaintiffs, U.S. trademark owners,
were seeking an order directing the Customs Service to exclude from en-
try into the United States certain gray market goods that were manufac-
tured by the foreign subsidiaries or licensees of the U.S. trademark
owners and brought into this country by unrelated third parties without
the authorization of the U.S. trademark owners.
20 6
The third party importers and dealers were allegedly obtaining a
free-ride on the goodwill and advertising that the trademark owner had
established in the United States and then underselling the authorized
U.S. dealers by as much as thirty percent. 20 7 The plaintiffs claimed that
they were entitled to have the gray market goods excluded under both
section 42 of the Lanham Act of 1946 and section 526(a) of the Tariff
Act of 1930.208 The defendants in the case were the United States of
America, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Commissioner of the
United States Customs Service. Two retailers that sell such gray market
204. Id. at 103.
205. Id. at 111. The court said, "We think the natural, virtually inevitable reading of § 42 is that
it bars foreign goods bearing a trademark identical to a valid U.S. trademark but physically different,
regardless of the trademark's genuine character abroad or affiliation between the producing firms."
Id.
206. COPIAT v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 844, 846 (D.DC. 1984).
207. Id. at 850.
208. Id. at 846.
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goods intervened as defendants, the K-Mart Corporation, which operates
more than 2000 discount department stores, and 47th Street Photo, Inc.,
which sells camera, video and other electronic equipment.
20 9
After deciding that it had subject matter jurisdiction in this case,
2 10
the district court dismissed the claim under section 42 of the Lanham
Act for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, since the
trademarks in this case were not "counterfeit or spurious."' 2 t' After an
examination of the history of section 526 of the Tariff Act and of the
Customs regulation, section 133.2 1(c), the court remarked that Congress,
by not altering the Customs Service's interpretation of the statute, ap-
proved of the regulation. 2 12 Furthermore, the court found Customs' in-
terpretation of the statute "long-standing and consistent," and as such it
deserved to be given "considerable weight. ' 21 3 Finally, the court con-
cluded that the regulation was a sufficiently reasonable interpretation of
section 526, since the statute was meant merely to cover the Katzel situa-
tion, that is to say, a situation in which a foreign manufacturer sells its
trademark rights to an American and then tries to market its goods in
the United States through channels other than the American
purchaser .
214
Though the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed
with the district court about the jurisdictional issue, it disagreed with the
district court's holding on the merits of the case, finding the Customs
regulation a violation of section 526.215 The court did not decide
whether the regulation violated section 42 of the Lanham Act because it
had already held that section 133.21(c) was invalid since it could not be
squared with section 526 of the Tariff Act. 216 After a detailed analysis of
the legislative and judicial history of section 526, the court concluded
that the congressional intent in section 526 was clear; there are no excep-
tions to the statute's coverage, 2 1 7 since the statute was written to protect
all trademarks "owned by a citizen of ... the United States, and regis-
209. Several importers and distributors of gray market goods presented amicus briefs. Id. at
846-47.
210. Whereas the Court of International Trade in Vivitar held that it had exclusive jurisdiction
over claims arising under § 526 of the Tariff Act under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a), the COPIATcourt held
that it had general federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and specific jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) of actions relating to trademarks. COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. at 847.
211. Id. at 848 (absent the Katzel situation, § 42 only applies to "merchandise bearing counter-
feit or spurious trademark that 'copy or simulate' genuine trademarks").
212. Id. at 852.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. COPIAT v. United States, 790 F.2d 903, 905 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
216. Id. at 907.
217. Id. at 908.
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tered in the Patent and Trademark Office by a person domiciled in the
United States ... unless written consent of the owner of such trademark
is produced at the time of making entry. ' 21 8 The appellate court added
that the theory of congressional acquiescence accepted by the district
court was too tenuous. 219 The Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia not only dismissed the district court's view that the regulation
was a sufficiently reasonable interpretation of section 526, but it also re-
jected the Federal Circuit's reasoning in Vivitar that the regulations
could be upheld "as a reasonable exercise of administratively initiated
enforcement" 220 since Customs had never really justified the regulation
as an exercise of enforcement discretion. 22' However, despite the D.C.
Circuit's holding that Customs regulation section 133.21(c) was invalid,
the court would only grant declaratory relief, since the injunctive relief
sought was "not an order compelling the Customs Service to exclude
specific goods, but rather a broad decree that would entail continuing
supervision by the courts.
'222
B. The Supreme Court
Justice Kennedy wrote the relatively short, straightforward opinion
for the Court. Justice Brennan, who would have held all three subsec-
tions of the regulation valid, wrote a detailed opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part, offering a different rationale for finding section
133.21(c)(1) and (2) valid. Justice Scalia, on the other hand, who also
wrote a detailed opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, would
have found all three subsections of the regulation invalid. The Justices
based their interpretations on the language of the regulation vis-a-vis sec-
tion 526 and on their different views of the legislative history. Signifi-
cantly, the Court did not address the related issue of whether the
regulations are inconsistent with section 42 of the Lanham Act, which
prohibits the importation of goods that bear marks that "copy or simu-
late" U.S. trademarks.
1. The Decision
In K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. ,223 the opinion of the Supreme
218. 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1975).
219. COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 917 (the unsuccessful attempts to modify § 526 suggest that Congress
rejected a narrow view of the scope of § 526).
220. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also supra notes
181-182 and accompanying discussion.
221. COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 918.
222. Id.
223. 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988). The jurisdiction issue was heard separately in K Mart Corp. v.
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Court 224 began with a presentation of three cases in which the gray mar-
ket problem may arise.225 The first case, referred to by the Court as the
prototypical case, resembled the facts in Katzel. It involves a domestic
firm that purchases the trademark rights from a foreign firm in order to
register the trademark and sell the goods in the United States. In-
trabrand competition might arise if either the foreign manufacturer
could, notwithstanding the fact that it had sold the exclusive rights to an
American firm to market the goods in the United States, import the
goods into this country or if third parties could purchase the foreign
firm's goods abroad and then import them into the United States. The
resulting parallel importation could jeopardize the domestic trademark
owner's investment. 226 All of the Justices agreed that under the case I
scenario section 526 bars the importation of gray market goods.227
The second case involves a domestic firm that registers the trade-
mark in the United States for goods that an affiliated manufacturer has
manufactured in a foreign country.228 The Court presented three varia-
tions of this case. In what the Court called case 2a, the foreign firm
wishes to control the sale and distribution of its goods in the United
States. The foreign firm, therefore, incorporates a subsidiary in the
United States, which, in turn, registers a trademark identical to its for-
eign parent's trademark under its own name in the United States. Paral-
lel importation occurs when third parties, or even the affiliate itself,
imports the registered trademarked goods into the country. 229 In case
2b, an American firm establishes a subsidiary corporation abroad for the
Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 950 (1988). The Court held that the Court of International Trade did not
have exclusive jurisdiction over this case." The only petitioner to contest the jurisdiction, 47th Street
Photo, Inc., offered two theories. First, 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (i) (3) (see supra note 176 for text) gives the
Court of International Trade exclusive jurisdiction over suits involving embargoes. The Supreme
Court rejected this argument, since § 526 does not impose an embargo on gray market goods because
it is the U.S. trademark holder who requests, at its option, the help of the Customs Service in re-
stricting the entry of certain goods. Justice Scalia, in his dissenting opinion, disagreed with the
Court about whether § 526 imposes an embargo.
The second theory presented by 47th Street Photo, Inc. was that the Court of International
Trade has jurisdiction over cases that contest the administrative "denial of a protest" challenging the
Custom's excluding of goods from entry. The Court rejected this theory as well, since the action
involves a challenge to the entry rather than to the exclusion of certain gray market goods. The
Court found that this case did not involve a "protest" and thus did not fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade.
224. Justice Kennedy was joined with respect to Parts I and II-A by Rehnquist, C.J., and White,
Blackmun, O'Connor, and Scalia, JJ., with respect to Part 11-B by White, J., and with respect to Part
II-C by Rehnquist, C.J., and Blackmun, O'Connor, and Scalia, JJ. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,
108 S. Ct. at 1814.
225. Id. at 1814-15.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1818.




manufacture of goods, and in case 2c the American firm establishes an
unincorporated manufacturing division abroad. In both cases 2b and 2c
the foreign division manufactures the goods for distribution in the United
States. The parallel importation occurs when the goods are sold abroad
to a third party, who then imports the goods into the United States.
2 30
The third case is one in which the domestic holder of the registered
U.S. trademark authorizes an independent foreign manufacturer to use
the trademark. Generally the foreign manufacturer is given the exclusive
right to use the trademark and to distribute the goods abroad on condi-
tion that the goods are not imported into the United States. Again, par-
allel importation occurs when either the foreign manufacturer reneges on
its promise not to import the goods into the United States or when a
third party purchases the goods abroad and then imports them into the
United States.2
31
The Court then analyzed the Customs regulation in question, sec-
tion 133.2 1(c), which creates exceptions for certain categories of goods to
exclude them from the overall protection of section 526(a) of the Tariff
Act of 1930. The Court separated the three subparts of the regulation
into two categories, the common-control exception to section 526 and the
authorized-use exception. The Court upheld the validity of the common-
control exception incorporated in section 133.21(c)(1)-(2), which does
not restrict imported goods if either the foreign and U.S. trademark is
owned by the same person or entity or if the foreign and domestic trade-
mark owners are parent/subsidiary companies or otherwise subject to
common control or ownership.232 The Court held invalid the author-
ized-use exception in section 133.21(c)(3), which allows the importation
of goods that bear a registered trademark under the authorization of the
U.S. trademark holder.2
33
In reaching its conclusion, the Court followed the standard by
which it determines whether a regulation is a valid interpretation of a
statute. The Court first looked at the language and design of the statute
to determine if any ambiguities exist. The Court found two phrases in
section 526 sufficiently ambiguous. The Court noted that the first term,
"owned by," is unclear in that a trademark can be owned by more than
one entity, such as a parent and a subsidiary of the same company. The
Court also found the words, "of foreign manufacture" ambiguous in that
they could mean either "in a foreign country," "by a foreign company,"
230. Id.
231. Id.




or "in a foreign country by a foreign company. '234
Since the Court found the language of section 526(a) ambiguous
with respect to the issues addressed by the Customs regulation, the Court
examined the agency's definition of the ambiguous terms and found that
they were not in conflict with the statute and thus represented a reason-
able construction of the statute. For that reason the Court found section
133.21(c)(1) and (2) valid.235 On the other hand, since the ambiguous
language of the statute does not pertain to the authorized-use exception
where there is no common ownership involved, the Court held that the
statute protects trademark owners who have authorized foreign manu-
facturers to use the trademark; therefore, section 133.21(c)(3) is inva-
lid. 236 Because the invalidation of this subsection would not impair the
functioning of the statute, and because there is no indication that the
regulation would not have been passed if it were not for the inclusion of
this subsection, the Court severed section 133.21(c)(3) from the rest of
the regulation. 23
7
2. Justice Brennan's Opinion 238
Though Justice Brennan agreed with the holding that the common
control exceptions, section 133.21(c)(1) and (2), were valid, his reasoning
was different. In analyzing the language of section 526, he found a pro-
tectionist "flavor" indicating that Congress had meant to protect only
domestic interests. Specifically, the statute requires that the trademark
be registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, that the trade-
mark holder be domiciled in the United States, and that the manufac-
turer be organized within the United States.239 As Justice Brennan
analyzed the legislative history of section 526(a), he concluded that if
Congress had any intent at all regarding the statute, it was to exclude
foreign manufacturers from its protection. 240 Justice Brennan arrived at
this conclusion by distinguishing cases 1 and 2. The victim of the gray
market importation in case 1, who has purchased the rights to register
the trademark and sell the goods in the United States, has a large invest-
234. Id. at 1818.
235. Id. (when a statute is imprecise, the enforcing agency can choose any reasonable interpreta-
tion of the statute).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1819.
238. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan was joined by
Marshall and Stevens. JJ. Justice White joined as to Part IV.
239. Id. at 1820 (protecting only domestic interests was characteristic of the times).
240. Id. at 1826. Moreover, much of the limiting language of § 526 would be pointless if a
foreign manufacturer could insulate itself from competition from the sale of gray market goods by
incorporating a subsidiary in the United States to register its trademark. Id. at 1820-21.
1989]
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ment at stake with no control over the importation of gray market goods.
On the other hand, the case 2 victim, who has a common ownership or
parent/subsidiary relationship with the foreign company, has a number
of options available, such as only importing directly to the affiliate, im-
posing restrictions against resale as a condition on its sales abroad, or
curtailing sales abroad all together.
24 1 '
In addition, Justice Brennan noted that two of the three current lim-
itations 242 to the statute were added after the original draft, namely "of
foreign manufacture" and "owned by a citizen of, or by a corporation or
association created or organized within, the United States." Justice
Brennan was of the opinion that the legislative history indicates that sec-
tion 526 was enacted to overrule Katzel.243 While conceding that the
circuit court's reading of the legislative history was plausible, Justice
Brennan rejected it. In Justice Brennan's view, had Congress passed sec-
tion 526 to reject the prevailing universality theory which stated that
trademarks did not confer property rights over the trademarked goods,
Congress not only would have acknowledged such a rejection, but it
would have referred the matter to a committee to be studied.
244
Justice Brennan then considered the Customs regulation, conclud-
ing that the agency has "always denied complete exclusionary protection
to an American trademark registrant when it knew the importer to be a
subsidiary or parent of the foreign user of the trademark. ' 245 Since the
Supreme Court does not lightly overturn longstanding administrative
regulations, and since the business community has relied on this adminis-
trative interpretation of the statute, Justice Brennan agreed that the com-
mon control exceptions are valid.
24 6
Justice Brennan then focused on the authorized-use exception, sec-
tion 133.21(c)(3), which excludes from the protection of section 526 U.S.
trademarked goods when the trademark owner has given licenses to for-
eign manufacturers to use their trademarks. Justice Brennan found am-
241. Id. at 1823.
242. The three limitations in § 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930 are: 1) when the product is "of
foreign manufacture;" 2) when it bears a trademark "owned by" either a U.S. citizen or "a corpora-
tion . . .created or organized within the United States;' and 3) when "a person domiciled in the
United States" has registered the trademark. Id. at 1820.
243. Id. at 1823.
244. Id. at 1826 (before effecting a radical change in prevailing legal doctrine, Congress refers
the matter to a committee with expertise in the area).
245. Id. at 1828 (citing Atwood, supra note 103, at 307). Before 1953. however, Customs was
not specifically eliciting information whether a parent/subsidiary relationship existed between the
U.S. and foreign trademark holders. Atwood, supra note 103, at 307.




biguity in the statute with regard to the authorized-use of a trademark,
though he admitted that the ambiguity is not immediately apparent. Ac-
cording to Justice Brennan, the law was not clear regarding the transfer-
ring of trademark rights until after the passage of the Lanham Act of
1946. Therefore, Congress, when enacting section 526(a), did not ad-
dress the case 3, authorized-use situation. In determining whether sec-
tion 133.21(c)(3) represents a permissible construction of the ambiguous
terms of the statute, Justice Brennan compared the case 1 victim, who
has purchased the rights from a foreign company to register a trademark,
to the case 3 victim, who has authorized a foreign company to use its
trademark. Whereas the case 1 victim has no control over the importa-
tion of gray market goods, the case 3 victim has recourse, in that he can
either revoke or deny licenses. In sum, Justice Brennan would uphold
the entire regulation.
24 7
3. Justice Scalia's Opinion
2 48
In Justice Scalia's view, section 133.21(c)(1)(2) & (3) is in conflict
with the clear language of section 526(a) of the Tariff Act. First consid-
ering the term, "owned by," Justice Scalia agreed that though the term is
ambiguous when applied to domestic subsidiaries of foreign corporations
(case 2a), he saw "owned by" as unambiguous as applied to cases 2b,
where the goods are manufactured abroad by the domestic trademark
owner's subsidiary, and 2c, where the goods are manufactured abroad by
the trademark holder. Moreover, Justice Scalia found nothing ambigu-
ous about the term "merchandise of foreign manufacture," which in
common usage simply means goods manufactured abroad. Justice Scalia
further noted that the Court's interpretation of "of foreign manufacture"
may exclude even some case 1 victims from the protection of the statute,
since it is possible for a foreign trademark owner to license one American
firm to use its trademark in the United States and license other American
firms to use its trademark in foreign countries. In this situation it is con-
ceivable that other American firms could import the trademarked goods,
since the goods would not be "of foreign manufacture." In addition, Jus-
tice Scalia pointed out that the Customs Service itself interpreted "of
foreign manufacture" to mean manufactured abroad.
24 9
247. Id. at 1830.
248. Id. at 1831 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia was joined
by the Chief Justice and by Blackmun and O'Connor, JJ.
249. Id. at 1831-32. Another difficulty that Justice Scalia found with the majority's opinion is
that although the Customs Service is informed of the country of origin of imported goods. there is no
regulation requiring the registration of the nationality of the manufacturer. Justice Scalia saw the
Court's holding as not only placing a burden on the Customs Service to devise a system whereby it
19891
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Justice Scalia agreed with the Court that there is no ambiguity in the
statute vis-A-vis case 3. He disagreed with Justice Brennan's reasoning
that, as Justice Scalia put it, "if the enacting Congress had foreseen mod-
ern circumstances, it would have adopted such an exception, since other-
wise the effect of the law would extend beyond its originally
contemplated purpose. ' 250 According to Justice Scalia, each Congress
has the opportunity to change laws when circumstances have changed
since their enactment. Justice Scalia saw the power of the Court being
exercised only 1) when it is clear that the circumstances that have
changed were not envisioned by the enacting Congress and 2) when the
changed circumstances cause the statute to exceed its original purpose.
Justice Scalia did not see either condition met in this case. As for the
first condition, Justice Scalia pointed to a number of cases, including Kat-
zel, which indicated that Congress was familiar with the assignment of
trademarks in different regions of the country, thereby suggesting that
Congress chose not to create an exception when it enacted section 526(a).
Secondly, Justice Scalia did not agree with Justice Brennan that the equi-
ties are different in cases 1 and 3. Justice Scalia did not believe that the
case 3 victim, who has authorized a foreign company to use its trade-
mark, has any less investment at stake or any more control over the im-
portation of gray market goods than does the case 1 victim, who has
purchased its trademark rights, especially since it is usually third parties
who are doing the damage. 25' In sum, Justice Scalia believed that section
526(a) goes beyond the facts of Katzel.2 52
IV. ANALYSIS
The title of the case, K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., itself, naming a
large American retailer and a well-known, high priced brand-name, indi-
cates how big the financial interests involved in the gray market issue are.
The opinion in K Mart reflects certain deficiencies in the clarity of the
law regarding the importation of gray market goods. The real issue is
whether gray market goods should be allowed into the country. Instead,
the question presented to the Court was whether Customs may let them
in, and that question was in the very small context of the Tariff Act. The
decision can only be disappointing for both proponents and opponents of
becomes informed of the manufacturer's nationality, but also as conflicting with "mutually accepted
understandings" with trading partners. who might not appreciate a regulation that treats American
manufactured goods on American soil better than American manufactured goods in foreign
countries.
250. Id. at 1834.




the gray market, since each had fingers crossed that the Supreme Court
would officialize the policy preferred by their side. K Mart demonstrates
that the legal issue of whether the Customs regulation is valid and the
policy issue of whether the gray market importation of goods should be
banned cannot be resolved by the same forum. Moreover, recent litiga-
tion has shown that the validity of the same Customs regulation is still
being challenged vis-A-vis section 42 of the Lanham Act.
25 3
To arrive at its conclusion, the Court focused on two phrases in the
statute and asked whether they were ambiguous and whether the Cus-
toms Service's interpretation was consistent with the meaning of the stat-
ute. This approach, along with the Court's depiction of the several
common cases in which gray market importation results, differs consider-
ably from the approaches used by the lower courts. To begin with, this
approach lends itself to the type of diffusion of opinions that was seen in
K Mart. The fact that the Justices did not agree on the various combina-
tions of results available under this approach in itself both points to
weaknesses of the approach and reflects the magnitude of the issue.
From the lower courts up through the Supreme Court, a number of
learned judges and Justices have been faced with the issue of the validity
of the Customs regulation that excludes certain gray market goods from
the protection of section 526(a) of the Tariff Act. What reached the
Supreme Court was a conflict between a particular statute and regula-
tions that interpret it. The statute in question is itself the center of con-
troversy with the Customs regulation masking the real issue of whether
allowing the importation of gray market goods is a sound policy or not.
However, for the moment at least, the Supreme Court has the last word
on the validity of section 133.2 1(c) with respect to the Tariff Act, 2 54 thus
the last word on which gray market goods may legally enter the country.
A. Inherent Difficulties of a Linguistic Analysis
The approach taken by the Supreme Court in K Mart in itself dem-
onstrates that the judiciary is not the proper vehicle for a final determina-
tion of the gray market problem. The Court was limited to the discrete
issues presented to it. The real conflict behind the COPIA T litigation
involved the questions of whether gray market goods should be banned
253. Lever Bros. v. United States, 877 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Lever Bros. raises issues about
material differences between goods made for the domestic market and gray market goods that may
eventually need to be resolved by the Supreme Court. For a discussion of Lever Bros.. see supra
notes 199-205 and accompanying text.
254. As the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Lever Bros. demonstrates, since Customs has used the same
regulation to interpret § 42 of the Lanham Act, the controversy over § 133.21(c) is not over.
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from U.S. markets and how far a U.S. registered trademark protects its
holder. The Court, however, was not faced with answering the real gray
market questions, but rather was faced with analyzing an administrative
agency's interpretation of a statute.
Predictably, the Court scrupulously analyzed the language of both
section 526(a) and the Customs regulation. The majority opinion laid
the foundation for the subsequent analysis of the meaning of the lan-
guage of the statute first by depicting certain general contexts in which
parallel importation of goods may occur, and then by categorizing the
regulation itself into common-usage and authorized-use exceptions. 255
Justice Kennedy in essence made only a passing reference to the legisla-
tive history of the statute and the Customs regulation by explaining in a
footnote that the threshhold question is essentially whether the language
of the statute is ambiguous and whether the regulation is a permissible
construction of the statute.
256
The more interesting analyses in K Mcrt can be found in the tension
between Justices Brennan and Scalia in their opposite views of the inter-
pretation of section 526(a) and its legislative history. Justice Brennan's
focus on the protectionist slant of the statute257 appeared to be a reason-
able explanation of the congressional intent in passing section 526 until
Justice Scalia pointed out that assignments of goodwill and trademark
rights to those doing business in different areas of the country was a com-
mon enough practice before the passage of section 526(a). 2 58 In two dif-
ferent parts of his opinion Justice Brennan presented the trademark
owner with certain facile options to eliminate or alleviate the flow of par-
allel importations of their goods. 259 Justice Scalia capsulized his con-
trary view of the extent of the problem when, toward the end of his
opinion, he stated, "It is not the affiliates who are doing the damage but
third parties. '2
60
With the framework of the Court's analysis set on the language of
the statute, Justice Brennan's study turned toward the legislative history
255. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1816.
256. Id. at 1815.
257. Id. at 1820.
258. Id. at 1835. Unrelated businesses in different territories could own and use an identical
trademark even before 1920, which meant that a trademark owner doing business in one territory
could assign the business, goodwill and rights to the trademark in a different territory. Justice Scalia
supported these assertions with case cites from that era. Id.
259. Id. at 1823, 1830. Even Justice Brennan's options are plagued with the insertion, "if legal"
and do not take into account that the trademark holder must abide by the laws of the other countries
he is dealing with, and thus the options may not in fact be available.
260. Id. at 1836 (since third parties are responsible for "the bulk of the gray market," affiliated
trademark holders are also deserving of protection under § 526).
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of section 526. When, however, his historical analysis reached the 1950s,
Justice Brennan simply glossed over that era in a parenthetical stating
"for reasons not relevant here. '261 Yet, the events of the Guerlain litiga-
tion were significant in molding the Customs' current interpretation of
section 526(a). 262 In fact, none of the Supreme Court opinions in K Mart
ever mentioned the Guerlain case, which, according to the lower courts
and to many scholars, was the very basis of the Customs regulation in
question in K Mart, section 133.21(c). 26 3 The fact that in 1959 the
Supreme Court deferred to the Solicitor General's request to vacate the
holding in Guerlain in order to get a clarification on the controversy from
Congress is in itself certainly an important topic to consider in analyzing
the history of the statute and the Customs regulation. Customs has been
accused of basing its current interpretation of section 526(a) on its view
of outdated antitrust considerations regarding intrabrand competition.
2 64
The circuit court in COPIA T addressed its concern about the influence of
Guerlain on the current regulation,265 yet none of the Supreme Court
opinions responded to that concern.
In contrast to both the majority's and Justice Brennan's opinions,
Justice Scalia did not see ambiguity in the words of the statute.266 Justice
Scalia pointed out the deficiencies in the majority's rigid application of its
rule of ambiguous language by showing how the majority's holding may
inadvertently exclude some case 1 victims, who, as U.S. firms, have
purchased trademark and goodwill rights from a foreign firm.267 He also
had difficulty accepting the Court's view that the statute's protection ex-
tends only to the case 1 type victims when other victims of the gray mar-
ket have at least as much of an investment and as little control over the
influx of gray market goods as the case 1 victim. 2 68 Justice Scalia con-
cluded that since the gray market problem is generally attributable to
261. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1820.
262. COPIAT v. United States, 790 F.2d 903, 916 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (citing Letter from Treasury
Secretary Donald T. Regan to Senator Dennis De Concini, December 23, 1983 (the regulations are
based on the Guerlain case)).
263. See supra note 163 and accompanying discussion.
264. COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 916. The Court held that intrabrand competition may in fact have
procompetitive effects. Continental Tv., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 54 (1977). See supra
notes 160-168 and accompanying discussion.
265. COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 915-16. Guerlain was also addressed by the Vivitar and Olympus
courts. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1566-67 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Olympus Corp. v.
United States, 792 F.2d 315, 319 (2d Cir. 1986).
266. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1831-32. "[l]t is impossible to conclude that a trademark owned by a
United States corporation and applied abroad either by the corporation or its foreign subsidiary is
'owned by' anyone other than a United States corporation.'" Id. at 1831. "The phrase 'of foreign
manufacture' is a common usage, well understood to mean 'manufactured abroad'." Id. at 1832.
267. Id. at 1836.
268. Id. (the equities involved in case I and case 3 do not differ significantly since the vulncrabil-
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third parties, it is not reasonable to conclude that some trademark own-
ers have a greater need for the protection of section 526.269
The opinions of Justices Brennan and Scalia are important in that
they shed more light on what the Court considered in arriving at the
holding. The Court's focus on the linguistic details of section 526 and
the Customs regulation that interprets it led to a holding that neither
accepted nor rejected the gray market as a U.S. policy. The Supreme
Court's analysis of the construction of the statute and regulation was
destined to be inadequate as a final statement on the gray market prob-
lem. This inadequacy becomes particularly striking in light of more re-
cent challenges to the Customs regulation section 133.21(c) through
section 42 of the Lanham Act. If Lever Brothers270 eventually reaches
the Supreme Court, a linguistic approach as was seen in K Mart might
very well result in certain subsections of the Customs regulation being
valid for the Tariff Act and invalid for the Lanham Act, or vice versa.
B. Policy Considerations
Whether one is for or against the gray market, the Supreme Court
decision does not settle the matter in a final, satisfying way. The task of
deciding on a gray market policy is not an easy one. Congress as a whole
has generally avoided the issue over the course of the years. The recent
effort by the Reagan Administration to come up with a single gray mar-
ket policy likewise ended with the committee offering a list of options
rather than a single concrete policy recommendation. 27 1 The difficulty
with formulating a definite policy statement is that, whichever side of the
gray market is adopted, somebody will be adversely affected, be it the
trademark holder, the gray market importers and dealers, or even the
consumer. The benefit to be derived from a clarification on the law re-
garding the gray market importation of goods is that, though some peo-
ple will be initially hurt, a definite policy will provide predictability
around which business plans could be made. Under the status quo, more
damage is done by the lack of clarity since trademark holders are permit-
ted to bring suits against gray market importers under various legal theo-
ries2 72 to have a court determine on a case-by-case basis if the trademark
ity to gray market imports, the investment in goodwill, and the lack of direct control over the harm
is the same in both cases).
269. Id.
270. Lever Bros. v. United States. 877 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
271. See supra note 62 and accompanying discussion.
272. The legal theories under which a plaintiffcan file a trademark infringement suit are § 42 of
the Lanham Act. unfair competition under § 337 of the Tariff Act. and trademark infringement
under state law. Bender and Gerber, supra note 13, at 15, col. 3. Additional theories include unjust
[Vol. 65:221
GRAY MARKET CONTROVERSY
holders have a right to some sort of relief, be it exclusion or damages.
This results in a waste of judicial resources and great expense for the
trademark holders who pursue such lawsuits as well as for the gray mar-
ket importers and retailers who must defend them.
The K Mart decision has shown that the Supreme Court is not the
proper vehicle for a gray market policy decision. Only Congress is in a
position to take into account the larger scheme, which includes not only
the Tariff Act and the Lanham Act, but also economic and antitrust con-
siderations, all within an international context.
First, Congress must consider the legal issue of how broadly to ex-
tend the coverage of the Tariff Act and the Lanham Act together, both in
terms of the protection for the trademark holder and the protection the
trademark offers the consumer. An attempt to amend either the Tariff
Act or the Lanham Act singularly, without taking the other into consid-
eration, may lead to the same confusion that currently exists regarding
the breadth of protection and would leave a door open for another legal
theory under which to pursue a gray market lawsuit.
27 3
The purpose of trademark laws, to protect the investment in good-
will and reputation of the U.S. registered trademark holder, necessarily
enters into a policy determination of whether the extent of this protection
outweighs any economic benefits of the gray market business. Since
trademark laws are also designed to protect the consumer, there are a
number of factual considerations to take into account. One considera-
tion, for example, is whether the goods involved are identical and have
the same origin. Congress may make a distinction between goods that
are of truly identical quality and those that look alike but are materially
different, i.e., that have a shorter life span, different taste, etc., or that
contain different warranties which can confuse the consumer. However,
such distinctions may be difficult for Customs to implement, since they
would require assessments about "material" differences at the border. 27 4
enrichment, third party beneficiary, and interference with contractual relations. Coggio, Gordon &
Coruzzi, The History and Present Status of Gray Goods, 75 TRADEMARK REP. 433, 487-93 (1986).
273. Of the two bills that are pending at the time of this Note, the House bill would allow the
importation of gray market goods by amending the Tariff Act. H.R. 771. 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989). If this bill passes, trademark holders will still have a private right of action to pursue reme-
dies under various legal theories, as they do now. The Senate bill, on the other hand, aims to place a
total ban on the importation of gray market goods. S. 626, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). If this bill
passes, a clear gray market policy will be achieved, since all gray market goods will be stopped at the
border. The result would be an end to the ambiguity of both allowing gray goods to enter the
country and then permitting litigation to sort out the rights of the particular parties. The Senate bill.
though presented as an amendment to the Lanham Act, encompasses the entire gray market
situation.
274. For example, Customs has referred to its interpretation of the Lanham Act as "an adminis-
trative necessity," since Customs would otherwise have to evaluate the amount of consumer confu-
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Another consideration is whether a demarking or a labeling requirement
such as Customs considered in its call for public solicitation in 1986275
would resolve the trademark confusion problem. Moreover, such factual
considerations in a gray market decision must be balanced against eco-
nomic concerns.
A gray market policy that protects certain parties over others will
have economic consequences. There are pros and cons on both sides of
the economic issue. Though the importation of gray market goods is
closely tied to the fluctuating price of the dollar,2 76 an entire business has
evolved around gray market imports. The economic justifications for the
gray market have been that gray market goods represent savings of up to
forty percent to the U.S. consumers.2 77 Congress will have to decide
whether or not such competition among products within the same brand
has a positive effect on the nation's economy. On the other side of the
coin is the question whether permitting parallel importations would have
the adverse effect of discouraging domestic trademark holders or distrib-
utors from investing in quality, research and development, and warran-
ties or other consumer services. The argument is that the consumer
could suffer in the long run if trademark owners cease to invest in contin-
uing research and development to maintain high quality control. Like
the legal issue of trademark protection, the issue of whether gray market
importations are beneficial for the U.S. economy does not have an obvi-
ous answer and will require a careful balancing of interests.
There are international ramifications to the problem since the stat-
ute in question is found in the Tariff Act and involves goods coming in
from foreign countries. Though the United States has unique domestic
policy considerations that may not result in the same perception of paral-
lel importation that other nations have, any gray market policy that the
United States adopts will have an effect on the exports of another nation.
A discussion of the gray market importation of goods cannot lose sight of
the international context in which it plays a role. Most of our major
trading partners have legalized the parallel importation of goods, and
thus it has been argued that "[i]t would be entirely inappropriate for the
U.S. Government to provide protection to foreign manufacturers whose
own governments do not provide comparable protection for discrimina-
sion or loss of goodwill that might result from the importation of the goods. Lever Bros. v. United
States, 877 F.2d 101, 110 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
275. See supra note 63 and accompanying discussion.
276. Bender & Gerber, supra note 13, at 15, col. I. Though by the time K Mart was decided the
dollar was low, the dollar may again rise substantially, some goods may be less affected by the
fluctuations in the dollar, and the importation of some luxury goods flourishes despite the dollar. Id.
277. 132 Cong. Rec. S8741-42 (daily ed. June 26, 1986) (statement of Sen. Chafee).
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tory pricing by American manufacturers. '" 2 78
While an understanding of the international perspectives on parallel
importation of goods is certainly desirable, foreign perspectives cannot be
controlling since they do not necessarily reflect American concerns. The
economic considerations of a U.S. gray market policy do not exactly mir-
ror the economic viewpoints of our trading partners. The nations of the
world have different points of departure in determining their gray market
policies. For example, in the United States, the fluctuation in the U.S.
dollar has played an important role in the gray market importation of
goods into this country, and it has been argued that trademark owners
are charging over-inflated prices in their American markets. 279 The
E.E.C. countries, on the other hand, have treaty commitments among
themselves, 280 which provide these nations with trade benefits that may
offset any disadvantage imposed by parallel importation. In addition to
the greater economic considerations, Congress may decide that the
United States places a more important weight on trademark and con-
sumer protection than do our trading partners. Thus, while keeping in
mind the U.S. interface with the international community, Congress
must, nonetheless, carve out a gray market policy best suited for U.S.
interests which can be clearly understood by the other nations in the
international community.
The changes that have occurred since the passage of the Tariff Act
of 1930 have been significant enough to warrant a reassessment of section
526(a) in a context that includes other legislation that has an impact on
the gray market. The courts, culminating with the Supreme Court, have
offered various reasonings in support of or against the Customs Service's
interpretation of the statute. However, the center of the controversy is
section 526 of the Tariff Act, and that is what Congress should review.
If, in fact, the gray market importation of goods is in the best interest of
the United States, it should not be validated through the back-door ap-
proach of a Supreme Court linguistic study of the words of a statute that
was enacted in 1930. The task is not an easy one. A large number of
economic interests are at stake. Since the status quo, which lacks clarity
in the U.S. gray market policy, also results in adverse effects for some
278. Id. at S742 (Senator Chafee arguing that the U.S. trademark laws are being exploited by
foreign manufacturers who then charge the American public over-inflated prices for their goods).
279. Id.
280. The Treaty of Rome, which was signed in 1957, established the European Economic Com-
munity. The Treaty contains provisions that restrict competition within the E.E.C. Takamatsu,
supra note 42, at 447.
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parties, it is the policy itself that must be faced squarely, not just the
words of the statute.
C Impact of the Decision
Now that the Supreme Court has had the final word, or at least the
most recent word, on the validity of section 133.21(c), the question be-
comes what impact the decision will have. The issues of U.S. policy re-
garding the importation of gray market goods and the extent of the
protection afforded the U.S. trademark holder under section 526(a) have
not been answered. The K Mart result, that gray market goods from
firms that have been only authorized to use a U.S. registered trademark
may no longer be brought across the U.S. borders, whereas gray market
goods from firms with a "common control" may enter the country, seems
almost arbitrary in terms of the larger gray market picture.
More important, the K Mart decision will influence the expansion of
business arrangements in the international arena, since companies must
now take the new Customs regulation into account when deciding
whether to incorporate or to grant licenses to use a particular trademark
abroad. For example, a U.S. company may decide only to license a for-
eign firm to use its trademark in order to insure control by having such
goods stopped at the border, whereas had the Supreme Court found the
entire regulation either valid or invalid, the same company may have
chosen to incorporate a subsidiary.
The K Mart holding will not change the situation for a number of
trademark owners or gray market importers, since a trademark owner's
right to seek remedies other than exclusion at the border will remain the
same.28  The courts will still be faced with making case-by-case deci-
sions. The trademark owner who has "common control" affiliations with
foreign firms using the U.S. registered trademark will still have to be on
the lookout for gray market freeloaders in order to find relief in the
courts. The uncertainties that accompany litigation will remain the same
for both the trademark holder and the gray market importer. The prob-
lem of unidentified third parties bringing in gray market goods will con-
tinue to burden the trademark owner's search for the source of the gray
market importation. 2 2 The third parties who are importing the gray
market goods will continue to run the risk of being haled into court.
281. Section 526(c) gives the trademark owner a private right of action. See supra note 10.
282. There are detective agencies that specialize in locating the third parties that are importing
gray market goods. See Gerber, Litigating the Copyright "Gray Market" Case, in GRAY MARKETS
AND PARALLEL IMPORTATION 269, 289 (Practising Law Institute ed. 1986).
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The severing of section 133.21(c)(3) will clearly restrict the importa-
tion of gray market goods produced by manufacturers who are licensed
to use the trademark in foreign countries. Customs will have to note
which goods come from a licensed foreign manufacturer and bar the en-
try of those goods at the border. Confusion may arise where the same
American trademark holder has licensed a firm in one country to use its
mark and has a subsidiary in another country that is also using its mark.
If third parties are attempting to bring in the gray market goods, Cus-
toms may have difficulty identifying the source in order to decide
whether to bar the entry of the goods.
The Supreme Court decision did not address the Customs Service's
discretion regarding section 42 of the Lanham Act of 1946. The suit
originally brought in COPIA T alleged a violation of section 42 of the
Lanham Act as well, but that claim was dismissed at the district court
level and did not reach the Supreme Court.283 The exceptions created by
Customs regulation section 133.21(c) also extend to section 42 of the
Lanham Act.2 84 Consequently, trademark owners may still bring suit
under section 42 under the theory that the gray market good, though
bearing a valid trademark, is not identical to the U.S. trademarked prod-
uct in quality. Recent litigation, however, strongly suggests that section
133.21(c) has not left the spotlight. 28 5 Moreover, section 337, which ad-
dresses unfair practices in import trade, still remains another possibility
for suit. In addition, infringement claims can still be brought under state
law. 286 In short, the legal alternatives and remedies that existed for
trademark holders before K Mart have not changed.
All that the K Mart decision defines is what will be stopped at the
border and what will not. Trademark owners, of course, would prefer to
have the Customs Service police the arrival of goods to prohibit the entry
of those goods which would interfere with their established reputations
and businesses. Gray market importers approve of the Customs regula-
tions that allow their goods unimpeded entry into the United States.
However, allowing the entry of goods and then permitting litigation on
the rights of the parties affected by that entry of goods is a waste of
judicial time and effort. The only way to end the conflict and the waste is
for Congress to make a policy determination once and for all.
283. COPIAT v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 844, 846 (D.D.C. 1984).
284. Staaf, supra note I, at 204.
285. Lever Bros. v. United States, 877 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1989).




Congress responded to the decision in Katzel with legislation to cor-
rect certain inequities. Congress should respond to K Mart with a delib-
erately thought-out policy determination that will clearly delineate
guidelines for both trademark owners and importers of gray market
goods. Banning the importation of gray market goods without the trade-
mark owner's consent presents the best solution. A restriction on paral-
lel importation would uphold the integrity of the U.S. registered
trademark by fully protecting the property rights conferred on the trade-
mark owner. In addition, the consumer would be best served both by the
elimination of confusion that the gray market goods cause and by the
continued quality and services provided by the trademark holder.
The problems of consumer confusion will continue to exist despite
attempts to inform the public about gray market goods. Consumers are
drawn to certain brand names over others because of advertising and
services associated with the brand name. While labeling an item as a
gray market good is a valid attempt to inform the public, any dissatisfac-
tion with the gray market goodwill inevitably reflect negatively on the
trademark itself and result in lower sales.
Related to consumer confusion is the problem of free-riding. Part of
the large discrepancy between the prices charged by the authorized seller
and the gray market seller is due to the fact that not only does the gray
market seller not have the expenses of advertising, consumer education,
and warranties of the authorized dealer, the gray market seller has a
market only because of the recognized labels and goodwill established by
the trademark owner. This situation is particularly exploitative since
more frequently it is third parties unrelated to the business agreement
that are profiting from the goodwill developed by the trademark owner.
Allowing this unfair arrangement to continue can only discourage trade-
mark holders from making the kinds of investments in maintaining a
superior product and in advertisements that have attracted the consum-
ers to their brands. Backing off from such investments can only harm
the consumer in the long run.
While it is true that trademark holders are profiting from both the
sales of their goods abroad and the inflated prices for the American mar-
ket, as long as a healthy competition exists among different brands in the
same markets, the consumers can make clear choices based on quality
and price without the confusion that intrabrand sales present.
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Therefore, of the two bills that are currently pending in Congress, 287
the bill introduced by Senator Hatch as an amendment to the Lanham
Act 288 provides the better solution to the gray market problem. The
amendment addresses the larger gray market context by placing a total
ban on such imports, thereby clearly defining trademark rights and clos-
ing all ambiguous loopholes through which later litigation could be pur-
sued. The House bill, introduced by Representative Chandler, on the
other hand, merely addresses the narrower issue of the extent of protec-
tion provided by section 526, leaving open legal theories under which the
trademark owner can still seek legal remedies. In sum, Senator Hatch's
proposed amendment to the Lanham Act to ban all parallel importation
provides the needed gray market policy statement and a solution to the
gray market controversy.
V. CONCLUSION
The detailed linguistic study of section 526 of the Tariff Act that
resulted in the majority opinion in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. has little
relation to the broader problem of the parallel importation of goods. The
judicial system has attempted to resolve the problem by facing the inter-
pretation that the challenged Customs regulation has given the purpose
of section 526 of the Tariff Act. The result was a variety of approaches
presented by the lower courts and finally a decision by the Supreme
Court. Significantly, it took one group of five Justices to validate part of
the regulation and five different Justices to invalidate the other part of
the regulation. The case history not only reflects the complexity of the
gray market issue, it also illustrates how inadequate the judicial system is
as a forum to resolve essentially larger policy issues.
Though the law is settled, since the Supreme Court has settled it,
there is little satisfaction with this anxiously awaited opinion, which
merely defined which goods will be stopped at the border and which will
not. Strong feelings run on both sides of the gray market issue. How-
ever, the Court's job is limited to the interpretation of existing statutes
and regulations. There is a larger scheme to be considered that so far
Congress has been reluctant to touch. Consequently, policy is being
made through interpretative decisions. The American public deserves a
policy statement, and that can only come from Congress. A total ban on
gray market importations is the best solution.
287. S. 626. 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989).
288. H.R. 771. 101st Cong.. 1st Sess. (1989).

